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Feasibility of Cryptography In a Blockchain-Enhanced ICS Security

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Kamal, Kazi, Islam, Rafiqul, Rahman, Azizur · 2026 · Companion Proceedings of the ACM Web Conference 2026

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 18 of the 18 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

Blockchain-homomorphic encryption (BC+HE) hybrids are increasingly promoted for Industrial Control System (ICS) security, yet their deployment at network edges violates fundamental real-time constraints. This paper demonstrates that BC+HE architectures introduce latencies of 51–440 ms in small networks (5–50 nodes), exceeding safety-critical loop requirements of ≤10 ms [21][22] by factors of 5–44×. Through a Latency Collision Matrix analysis spanning Purdue Model Levels 0–5, the paper shows that probabilistic blockchain consensus (non-deterministic jitter) and homomorphic encryption overhead (>100 ms compute-bound) create an architectural incompatibility: edge devices require >100k readings/sec with zero jitter, while BC+HE delivers significanlty less (< 1,000 TPS) with high variance. Offloading cryptography to SCADA gateways (Level 2) fails to resolve the problem, instead creating a ''dead zone'' bottleneck and exposing Level 2–3 inter-layer vulnerabilities. This paper proposes a Resource-Constrained Security Framework that decouples security layers: lattice-based lightweight cryptography (LBC) for Level 0-1 sensor-to-controller authentication (TLatticeAuth << Tsafety ), where the authentication time TLatticeAuth is significantly less than the safety margin Tsafety while reserving BC+HE for non-real-time enterprise layers (Levels 4–5). Lattice primitives (LWE, Ring-LWE) offer linear complexity, parallelizable operations, and deterministic execution suitable for FPGA/ASIC acceleration. The proposed architecture aligns cryptographic mechanisms with physical constraints rather than imposing IT security models on operational technology. This work delivers a falsifiable critique grounded in quantitative performance modeling: measured latencies, throughput limits, and architectural boundaries establish that current BC+HE integrations are operationally unsafe at ICS edges. The framework provides actionable guidance for operators (audit edge deployments, enforce layer separation), researchers (develop layer-specific metrics, hardware acceleration), and standards bodies (update IEC 62443 with latency budgets and cryptographic safety interfaces).

Overview

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Crossref · 10.1145/3774905.3794685

Cites

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Cited works that were retracted

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Citations

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Show all 18 references

Research works printed but not linked: 8

  1. 10.1109/ACCESS.2019.2904988 · doi:10.1109/access.2019.2904988
  2. 10.1109/JIOT.2017.2737747 · doi:10.1109/jiot.2017.2737747
  3. 10.6028/NIST.SP.800--82r3 · doi:10.6028/nist.sp.800--82r3
  4. Williams, T.J. and Rathwell, G.A. 1993. The Purdue Enterprise Reference Architecture. Technical Report 154. Purdue University Computer Integrated Manufacturing Laboratory, West Lafayette, IN.
  5. IEC. 2010. IEC 61508--1:2010 Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related systems - Part 1: General requirements. International Electrotechnical Commission, Geneva, Switzerland
  6. 10.1007/978--3--319--39028--4_9 · doi:10.1007/978--3--319--39028--4_9
  7. 10.1007/978--3--662--53357--4_8 · doi:10.1007/978--3--662--53357--4_8
  8. ISA/IEC. 2013. Security for industrial automation and control systems - Part 3--3: System security requirements and security levels. ISA-62443--3-3 (IEC 62443--3-3). International Society of Automation / International Electrotechnical Commission, Research Triangle Park, NC, USA.

Metadata

Authors
Kamal, K., Islam, R., & Rahman, A.
Affiliations
Charles Sturt University (AU)
Venue
Companion Proceedings of the ACM Web Conference 2026
Publisher
ACM
Published
2026-05-28
Pages
1326-1331
OpenAlex
W7162660287
Cited by
0
References
17
FWCI
0.00
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
Licence
cc-by-nc-nd
Locations
  • International World Wide Web Conference (WWW) (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
  • Charles Sturt University Research Output (CRO) (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Cryptography and Data Security
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Blockchain Technology Applications and Security
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
Keywords
industrial control systems, ICS security, latency analysis, real-time constraints, lattice-based cryptography, ring learning with errors, lightweight cryptography, Purdue model, blockchain consensus, IEC 62443

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Feasibility of Cryptography In a Blockchain-Enhanced ICS Security. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1145/3774905.3794685
The paper
Kamal, K., Islam, R., & Rahman, A. (2026). Feasibility of Cryptography In a Blockchain-Enhanced ICS Security. Companion Proceedings of the ACM Web Conference 2026. https://doi.org/10.1145/3774905.3794685

Data sources

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

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