The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities
Abstract
In most of microeconomic theory, consumers are assumed to exhibit decreasing marginal utilities. This paper considers combinatorial auctions among such buyers. The valuations of such buyers are placed within a hierarchy of valuations that exhibit no complementarities, a hierarchy that includes also OR and XOR combinations of singleton valuations, and valuations satisfying the gross substitutes property. While we show that the allocation problem among valuations with decreasing marginal utilities is NP-hard, we present an efficient greedy 2-approximation algorithm for this case. No such approximation algorithm exists in a setting allowing for complementarities. Some results about strategic aspects of combinatorial auctions among players with decreasing marginal utilities are also presented.
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Citations
Cites
COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS
Vickrey, W. (1961) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.x · Cited by 7,722
Fibonacci heaps and their uses in improved network optimization algorithms
Fredman, M. L., & Tarjan, R. E. (1987) · Journal of the ACM · doi:10.1145/28869.28874 · Cited by 3,132
Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making
Moulin, H. (1988) · doi:10.1017/ccol0521360552 · Cited by 1,279
Cited by
Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
Lehmann, D., Oćallaghan, L. I., & Shoham, Y. (2002) · Journal of the ACM · doi:10.1145/585265.585266 · Cited by 655
Self-citationOptimal approximation for the submodular welfare problem in the value oracle model
Vondrak, J. (2008) · Proceedings of the fortieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing · doi:10.1145/1374376.1374389 · Cited by 546
Metadata
- Authors
- Lehmann, B., Lehmann, D., & Nisan, N.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2001-10-14
- Pages
- 18-28
- OpenAlex
- W2004045061
- Cited by
- 230
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 13.45
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Lehmann, B., Lehmann, D., & Nisan, N. (2001). Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities. Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce. https://doi.org/10.1145/501158.501161
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