The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Analyzing the economic efficiency of eBay-like online reputation reporting mechanisms
Open accessAbstract
This paper introduces a model for analyzing marketplaces, such as eBay, which rely on binary reputation mechanisms for quality signaling and quality control. In our model sellers keep their actual quality private and choose what quality to advertise. The reputation mechanism is primarily used to determine whether sellers advertise truthfully. Buyers may exercise some leniency when rating sellers, which needs to be compensated by corresponding strictness when judging sellers'feedback profiles. It is shown that, the more lenient buyers are when rating sellers, the more likely it is that sellers will find it optimal to settle down to steady-state quality levels, as opposed to oscillating between good quality and bad quality. Furthermore, the fairness of the market outcome is determined by the relationship between rating leniency and strictness when assessing a seller's feedback profile. If buyers judge sellers too strictly (relative to how leniently they rate) then, at steady state, sellers will be forced to understate their true quality. On the other hand, if buyers judge too leniently then sellers can get away with consistently overstating their true quality. An optimal judgment rule, which results in outcomes where at steady state buyers accurately estimate the true quality of sellers, is analytically derived. However, it is argued that this optimal rule depends on several system parameters, which are difficult to estimate from the information that marketplaces, such as eBay, currently make available to their members. It is therefore questionable to what extent unsophisticated buyers are capable of deriving and applying it correctly in actual settings.
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Cites
The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism
Akerlof, G. A. (1970) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1879431 · Cited by 23,016
Resnick, P., Kuwabara, K., Zeckhauser, R., & Friedman, E. (2000) · Communications of the ACM · doi:10.1145/355112.355122 · Cited by 2,190 · cited 2×
“Analyzing the Economic Efficiency of eBay-like Online Reputation Reporting Mechanisms Chrysanthos Dellarocas Sloan School of Management Massachusetts Institute of Technology Cambridge, MA 02139, USA dell@mit.edu ABSTRACT This paper introduces a model for analyzing marketplaces, such as eBay, which rely on binary reput…”
Cited by
The Digitization of Word of Mouth: Promise and Challenges of Online Feedback Mechanisms
Dellarocas, C. (2003) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.49.10.1407.17308 · Cited by 3,433
Self-citationPeerTrust: Supporting Reputation-Based Trust for Peer-to-Peer Electronic Communities
Xiong, L., & Liu, L. (2004) · IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering · doi:10.1109/tkde.2004.1318566 · Cited by 1,788
A survey of peer-to-peer content distribution technologies
Androutsellis-Theotokis, S., & Spinellis, D. (2004) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/1041680.1041681 · Cited by 1,425
Kittur, A., Nickerson, J. V., Bernstein, M., Gerber, E., Shaw, A., Zimmerman, J., Lease, M., & Horton, J. (2013) · Proceedings of the 2013 conference on Computer supported cooperative work · doi:10.1145/2441776.2441923 · Cited by 1,034
PowerTrust: A Robust and Scalable Reputation System for Trusted Peer-to-Peer Computing
Zhou, R., & Hwang, K. (2007) · IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems · doi:10.1109/tpds.2007.1021 · Cited by 728
Metadata
- Authors
- Dellarocas, C.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2001-10-14
- Pages
- 171-179
- OpenAlex
- W3125944210
- Cited by
- 179
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 9.78
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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