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Privacy, economics, and price discrimination on the Internet
Abstract
The rapid erosion of privacy poses numerous puzzles. Why is it occurring, and why do people care about it? This paper proposes an explanation for many of these puzzles in terms of the increasing importance of price discrimination. Privacy appears to be declining largely in order to facilitate difierential pricing, which ofiers greater social and economic gains than auctions or shopping agents. The thesis of this paper is that what really motivates commercial organizations (even though they often do not realize it clearly themselves) is the growing incentive to price discriminate, coupled with the increasing ability to price discriminate. It is the same incentive that has led to the airline yield management system, with a complex and constantly changing array of prices. It is also the same incentive that led railroads to invent a variety of price and quality difierentiation schemes in the 19th century. Privacy intrusions serve to provide the information that allows sellers to determine buyers' willingness to pay. They also allow monitoring of usage, to ensure that arbitrage is not used to bypass discriminatory pricing.Economically, price discrimination is usually regarded as desirable, since it often increases the efficiency of the economy. That is why it is frequently promoted by governments, either through explicit mandates or through indirect means. On the other hand, price discrimination often arouses strong opposition from the public.There is no easy resolution to the conflict between sellers; incentives to price discriminate and buyers' resistance to such measures. The continuing tension between these two factors will have important consequences for the nature of the economy. It will also determine which technologies will be adopted widely. Governments will likely play an increasing role in controlling pricing, although their roles will continue to be ambiguous. Sellers are likely to rely to an even greater extent on techniques such as bundling that will allow them to extract more consumer surplus and also to conceal the extent of price discrimination. Micropayments and auctions are likely to play a smaller role than is often expected. In general, because of strong conflicting pressures, privacy is likely to prove an intractable problem that will be prominent on the the public agenda for the foreseeable future.
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Citations
Cited by
Information Privacy Research: an Interdisciplinary Review1
Smith, H. J., Dinev, T., & Xu, H. (2011) · MIS Quarterly · doi:10.2307/41409970 · Cited by 2,013
The Economics of Information Security
Anderson, R., & Moore, T. (2006) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1130992 · Cited by 823
Game theory meets network security and privacy
Manshaei, M. H., Zhu, Q., Alpcan, T., Bacşar, T., & Hubaux, J.-P. (2013) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/2480741.2480742 · Cited by 808
Privacy in the Internet of Things: threats and challenges
Ziegeldorf, J. H., Morchon, O. G., & Wehrle, K. (2014) · Security and Communication Networks · doi:10.1002/sec.795 · Cited by 610
An architecture for privacy-sensitive ubiquitous computing
Hong, J. I., & Landay, J. A. (2004) · Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Mobile systems, applications, and services · doi:10.1145/990064.990087 · Cited by 598
Privacy in electronic commerce and the economics of immediate gratification
Acquisti, A. (2004) · Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce · doi:10.1145/988772.988777 · Cited by 561
State of the Information Privacy Literature: Where Are We Now and Where Should We Go?
Pavlou, P. A. (2011) · MIS Quarterly · doi:10.2307/41409969 · Cited by 419
Strangers on a Plane: Context-Dependent Willingness to Divulge Sensitive Information
John, L. K., Acquisti, A., & Loewenstein, G. (2011) · Journal of Consumer Research · doi:10.1086/656423 · Cited by 414
Recent Developments in the Economics of Price Discrimination
Armstrong, M. (2013) · Advances in Economics and Econometrics · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139052276.006 · Cited by 267
Detecting price and search discrimination on the internet
Mikians, J., Gyarmati, L., Erramilli, V., & Laoutaris, N. (2012) · Proceedings of the 11th ACM Workshop on Hot Topics in Networks · doi:10.1145/2390231.2390245 · Cited by 244
Online Price Discrimination and EU Data Privacy Law
Zuiderveen Borgesius, F., & Poort, J. (2017) · Journal of Consumer Policy · doi:10.1007/s10603-017-9354-z · Cited by 213
An, J., Kwak, H., Jung, S.-G., Salminen, J., & Jansen, B. J. (2018) · Social Network Analysis and Mining · doi:10.1007/s13278-018-0531-0 · Cited by 164
Consumer response to norm-breaking pricing events in e-commerce
Garbarino, E., & Maxwell, S. (2010) · Journal of Business Research · doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2008.12.010 · Cited by 126
Privacy, Technology, and Aging: A Proposed Framework
Lorenzen-Huber, L., Boutain, M., Camp, L. J., Shankar, K., & Connelly, K. H. (2011) · Ageing International · doi:10.1007/s12126-010-9083-y · Cited by 124
Odlyzko, A. (2009) · Review of Network Economics · doi:10.2202/1446-9022.1169 · Cited by 102
Self-citationPriester, A., Robbert, T., & Roth, S. (2020) · Journal of Revenue and Pricing Management · doi:10.1057/s41272-019-00224-3 · Cited by 90
Crowd-assisted search for price discrimination in e-commerce: first results
Mikians, J., Gyarmati, L., Erramilli, V., & Laoutaris, N. (2013) · Proceedings of the ninth ACM conference on Emerging networking experiments and technologies · doi:10.1145/2535372.2535415 · Cited by 82
(2014) · Lirias · Cited by 61
Zafeiropoulou, A. M., Millard, D. E., Webber, C., & O'Hara, K. (2013) · Proceedings of the 5th Annual ACM Web Science Conference · doi:10.1145/2464464.2464503 · Cited by 53
“Other factors that influence individuals' privacy decisions are economic benefits [10, 11] and incentives towards price discrimination [17], which are considered to be significant motives for people to release their information.”
BackgroundReinforcement Learning for Fair Dynamic Pricing
Maestre, R., Duque, J., Rubio, A., & Arevalo, J. (2019) · Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-01054-6_8 · Cited by 37
Heidary, K., van der Rest, J.-P., & Custers, B. (2024) · Internet Policy Review · doi:10.14763/2024.4.1809 · Cited by 11
Metadata
- Authors
- Odlyzko, A.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Electronic commerce - ICEC '03
- Publisher
- ACM Press
- Published
- 2003
- Pages
- 355-366
- OpenAlex
- W2170405424
- Cited by
- 230
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 21.26
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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