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Security proofs for an efficient password-based key exchange

Bresson, Emmanuel, Chevassut, Olivier, Pointcheval, David · 2003 · Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Cited by 189

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

Password-based key exchange schemes are designed to provide entities communicating over a public network, and sharing a (short) password only, with a session key (e.g, the key is used for data integrity and/or confidentiality). The focus of the present paper is on the analysis of very efficient schemes that have been proposed to the IEEE P1363 Standard working group on password-based authenticated key-exchange methods, but which actual security was an open problem. We analyze the AuthA key exchange scheme and give a complete proof of its security. Our analysis shows that the AuthA protocol and its multiple modes of operations are provably secure under the computational Diffie-Hellman intractability assumption, in both the random-oracle and the ideal-ciphers models.

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Metadata

Authors
Bresson, E., Chevassut, O., & Pointcheval, D.
Venue
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Publisher
ACM
Published
2003-10-27
Pages
241-250
ISSN
1543-7221 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2041027981
Cited by
189
References
1
FWCI
5.31
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Security proofs for an efficient password-based key exchange. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1145/948109.948142
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Bresson, E., Chevassut, O., & Pointcheval, D. (2003). Security proofs for an efficient password-based key exchange. Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security. https://doi.org/10.1145/948109.948142

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