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On approximately fair allocations of indivisible goods
Abstract
We study the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods to a set of people from an algorithmic perspective. fair division has been a central topic in the economic literature and several concepts of fairness have been suggested. The criterion that we focus on is envy-freeness. In our model, a monotone utility function is associated with every player specifying the value of each subset of the goods for the player. An allocation is envy-free if every player prefers her own share than the share of any other player. When the goods are divisible, envy-free allocations always exist. In the presence of indivisibilities, we show that there exist allocations in which the envy is bounded by the maximum marginal utility, and present a simple algorithm for computing such allocations. We then look at the optimization problem of finding an allocation with minimum possible envy. In the general case the problem is not solvable or approximable in polynomial time unless P = NP. We consider natural special cases (e.g.additive utilities) which are closely related to a class of job scheduling problems. Approximation algorithms as well as inapproximability results are obtained. Finally we investigate the problem of designing truthful mechanisms for producing allocations with bounded envy.
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Cites
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The Unreasonable Fairness of Maximum Nash Welfare
Caragiannis, I., Kurokawa, D., Moulin, H., Procaccia, A. D., Shah, N., & Wang, J. (2016) · Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation · doi:10.1145/2940716.2940726 · Cited by 342
A Short Introduction to Computational Social Choice
Chevaleyre, Y., Endriss, U., Lang, J., & Maudet, N. (2007) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-69507-3_4 · Cited by 261
Bansal, N., & Sviridenko, M. (2006) · Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of Computing · doi:10.1145/1132516.1132522 · Cited by 256
Cake cutting: not just child's play
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Metadata
- Authors
- Lipton, R. J., Markakis, E., Mossel, E., & Saberi, A.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2004-05-17
- Pages
- 125-131
- OpenAlex
- W2121240598
- Cited by
- 514
- References
- 16
- FWCI
- 28.12
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Lipton, R. J., Markakis, E., Mossel, E., & Saberi, A. (2004). On approximately fair allocations of indivisible goods. Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce. https://doi.org/10.1145/988772.988792
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