The DOI matches its Crossref record; 90 of the 90 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Defining Bureaucratic Autonomy
Open accessAbstract
In political science, one issue still in need of greater theorizing is the proper measurement of bureaucratic autonomy, that is, the degree of discretion that political principals should grant to bureaucratic agents. This article reviews the literature on bureaucratic autonomy both in US administrative law and in political science. It uses the American experience to define five mechanisms by which political principals grant and limit autonomy, then goes on to survey the comparative literature on other democratic systems using the American framework as a baseline. Other democracies use different mixtures of these mechanisms, for example by substituting stronger ex post review for ex ante procedures or using appointment and removal power in place of either. We find that the administrative law and social science literatures on this topic approach it very differently, and that each would profit from greater awareness of the other discipline.
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“It embodies a radical rejection of the bureaucratic state, treating it as obsolete ballast to be bypassed and replaced through external substitution.”
From Authoritarian Drift, Variegated Paths: Mapping Administrative Transformation Strategies Under Illiberal Rule (2025) · cites this paper as [12]
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Citations
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Fukuyama, F. (2023) · Asia Pacific Journal of Public Administration · doi:10.1080/23276665.2023.2249142 · Cited by 33
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Metadata
- Authors
- Bersch, K., & Fukuyama, F.
- Affiliations
- Davidson College (US)
- Stanford University (US)
- ORCID
- Bersch, Katherine
- Venue
- Annual Review of Political Science
- Publisher
- Annual Reviews
- Published
- 2023-06-15
- Volume
- 26
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 213-232
- ISSN
- 1094-2939 (ISSN-L)
- 1545-1577
- OpenAlex
- W4311691028
- Cited by
- 58
- References
- 89
- Citations by year
- 2026: 22 · 2025: 11 · 2024: 21 · 2023: 4
- FWCI
- 6.18
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Locations
- Annual Review of Political Science (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Funders
- University of Notre Dame
- Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, University of Notre Dame
- Kellogg Institute for International Studies, University of Notre Dame
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Public Administration and Governance
- Social Sciences › Law › Administrative Law and Governance
- Social Sciences › Public Administration › Public Policy and Administration Research
- Keywords
- bureaucratic autonomy, administrative discretion, administrative law, ex post review
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