Cited by 151Psychology of Moral and Emotional JudgmentSocial Robot Interaction and HRIEthics and Social Impacts of AI

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 151 of the 151 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; none of the 117 sources its claims cite is checked for support yet.

The Moral Psychology of Artificial Intelligence

Open access
Bonnefon, Jean-François, Rahwan, Iyad, Shariff, Azim·2024·Annual Review of Psychology

Published version of a preprint

Abstract

Moral psychology was shaped around three categories of agents and patients: humans, other animals, and supernatural beings. Rapid progress in artificial intelligence has introduced a fourth category for our moral psychology to deal with: intelligent machines. Machines can perform as moral agents, making decisions that affect the outcomes of human patients or solving moral dilemmas without human supervision. Machines can be perceived as moral patients, whose outcomes can be affected by human decisions, with important consequences for human–machine cooperation. Machines can be moral proxies that human agents and patients send as their delegates to moral interactions or use as a disguise in these interactions. Here we review the experimental literature on machines as moral agents, moral patients, and moral proxies, with a focus on recent findings and the open questions that they suggest.

Overview

AI snapshot

Written from the paper’s full text.

TL;DR

This review organizes moral psychology research on AI into machines as moral agents, moral patients, and moral proxies, focusing on experimental findings and open questions. It argues that people apply distinct moral expectations and reactions to machines, including a persistent “machine penalty” in cooperation and unresolved challenges for value alignment.

Key findings

  • As implicit moral agents, people demand high machine performance: a representative German sample believed human experts would have a 20–30% mistake rate for credit default or recidivism but required machines to have a mistake rate below 10%; in a US driver sample, the median respondent believed they were in the top 25% of drivers and estimated two-thirds of crashes would be avoided if everyone drove like them, then required very high safety from self-driving cars.
  • Blame patterns are asymmetric: people judge crashes caused by self-driving cars as more severe and place more blame on the car than on a human causing a comparable crash, but when human and machine jointly produce a crash, people typically blame the human most; algorithmic discrimination also causes less moral outrage than human discrimination.
  • Cooperation shows a machine penalty in incentivized games: in a one-shot trust game, 34% reciprocated a machine’s trust versus 75% for a human; in a one-shot prisoners’ dilemma, 36% cooperated with machines versus 49% with humans; in a dictator game, people allocated 16% to a machine versus 39% to a human; in a public good game, contributions were 40% with machines versus 55% with humans. Repeated games suggest the machine penalty carries over unchanged.
  • Value alignment and proxy use remain unsettled: the Moral Machine Experiment considered nine possible priorities for AVs, leading to millions of scenarios; in a survey of 160 experiments, 82% of instructions did not explain what happened to machine earnings; machine masquerade/AI-mediated communication is described as a vast but understudied field.

Methods

  • Design: narrative review of experimental literature on machines as moral agents, moral patients, and moral proxies; no new empirical data are reported.
  • Data/sample: synthesizes cited experiments including representative population samples, incentivized economic games, autonomous-vehicle dilemma studies, and studies of online bot interactions.
  • Analysis: organizes findings by moral role and discusses open questions; no formal meta-analysis or systematic search protocol is described.

Limitations

  • The paper states that any review will only be a snapshot given the pace of AI change, and that it has not addressed every issue at the intersection of AI and moral psychology, such as AI plagiarism, sexbots, or AI effects on trust between human groups.
  • The paper notes that evidence is often concentrated in automated driving and it is not yet clear whether patterns such as the blame reversal generalize to other domains; it also states that value-alignment normative issues fall beyond moral psychology’s purview and that the machine masquerade section is speculative.
  • The text makes evident that, as a narrative review, it does not report a systematic search or quantitative synthesis, and some cited findings come from single experiments or specific samples.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1146/annurev-psych-030123-113559

Cites

151 of 151 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

82 Not checked yet · 15 No basis given · 6 Own interpretation

Verify all 117 references — free account

Show all 62 claims

  • It may state two separate claims as one. 30
  • Probably not a substantial claim. 14
41 of 41
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    There will almost always be a human in the same loop as the machine, so mistakes will most often be the result of a joint failure of human and machine.

    “Since there will almost always be a human in the same loop as the machine, mistakes will most often be the result of a joint failure of human and machine—so, how do people allocate responsibility and blame between humans and machines, when both contributed to a harmful mistake?”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    It is possible to capture the manifold of human cooperation by using lab-based games with financial incentives.

    “experimental economics has popularized the assumption that it is possible to capture the manifold of human cooperation by using lab-based games with financial incentives, such as dictator games, prisoners' dilemmas, ultimatum games, or public good games.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Money can be used as a proxy for the many currencies of human-machine cooperation.

    “These studies carry over the assumption that just as money can be used as a proxy for the many currencies of human-human cooperation, it can be used as a proxy for the many currencies of human-machine cooperation.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Machines have no affects, needs, or desires for anything.

    “This may sound strange, since machines have no affects, nor needs or desires for anything.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    AI enables machines to make autonomous decisions on behalf of human stakeholders.

    “By design, AI enables machines to make autonomous decisions on behalf of human stakeholders.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    AI can act independently.

    “because AI can act independently and has the potential to cause harm with unparalleled efficiency and at scale.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    People can already experiment with generative AI to create their profile pictures.

    “People can already experiment with generative AI to create their profile pictures”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The very recent and rapid emergence of AI-driven technology is colliding with moral intuitions forged by culture and evolution over the span of millennia.

    “the very recent and rapid emergence of AI-driven technology is colliding with moral intuitions forged by culture and evolution over the span of millennia.”
8 of 8

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

Citations

Cites

Show all 148 references

Research works printed but not linked: 12

  1. Angwin J, 2016, ProPublica
  2. Buolamwini J, 2018, PMLR, 81, 77
  3. Hamilton M., 2019, Am. Crim. Law Rev., 56, 1553
  4. Hao K, 2019, MIT Technology Review
  5. Kleinberg J, 2018, Q. J. Econ., 133, 237
  6. McAllister A., 2016, Minn. Law Rev., 101, 2527
  7. McCallum S, 2022, BBC News
  8. Mullainathan S., 2019, New York Times
  9. Pleiss G, 2017, Adv. Neural Inform. Process. Syst., 30, 5684
  10. Samuel S, 2020, Transp. Res. Interdiscip. Perspect., 5, 100147
  11. Smith A., 2019, Public attitudes toward computer algorithms
  12. Złotowski J, 2016, Paladyn J. Behav. Robot., 7, 55

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Metadata

Authors
Bonnefon, J.-F., Rahwan, I., & Shariff, A.
Affiliations
  • Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (FR)
  • Max Planck Institute for Human Development (DE)
  • University of British Columbia (CA)
Venue
Annual Review of Psychology
Published
2024-01-18
Volume
75
Issue
1
Pages
653-675
ISSN
  • 0066-4308 (ISSN-L)
  • 1545-2085
OpenAlex
W4386820363
Cited by
151
References
148
Citations by year
2026: 61 · 2025: 58 · 2024: 26
FWCI
5.67
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Annual Review of Psychology (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • HAL (submittedVersion, other-oa)
  • HAL (submittedVersion)
  • Toulouse 1 Capitole Publications (Université Toulouse I Capitole) (submittedVersion)
  • MPG.PuRe (Max Planck Society) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
  • PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
Funders
  • Agence Nationale de la Recherche (ANR-17-EURE-0010, ANR-19-P3IA-0004, ANR-17-EURE-, ANR‐19, PI3A-0004, 19-PI3A-0004, 17-EURE-00-10, ANR-19-PI3A-0004, ANR-17)
  • Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Social Robot Interaction and HRI
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
Keywords
moral psychology, artificial intelligence, moral agents, moral patients, human-machine collaboration, ethical dilemmas, anthropomorphism
MeSH terms
Animals, Artificial Intelligence, Humans, Intelligence, Morals

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