The Origins and Psychology of Human Cooperation
Abstract
Humans are an ultrasocial species. This sociality, however, cannot be fully explained by the canonical approaches found in evolutionary biology, psychology, or economics. Understanding our unique social psychology requires accounting not only for the breadth and intensity of human cooperation but also for the variation found across societies, over history, and among behavioral domains. Here, we introduce an expanded evolutionary approach that considers how genetic and cultural evolution, and their interaction, may have shaped both the reliably developing features of our minds and the well-documented differences in cultural psychologies around the globe. We review the major evolutionary mechanisms that have been proposed to explain human cooperation, including kinship, reciprocity, reputation, signaling, and punishment; we discuss key culture–gene coevolutionary hypotheses, such as those surrounding self-domestication and norm psychology; and we consider the role of religions and marriage systems. Empirically, we synthesize experimental and observational evidence from studies of children and adults from diverse societies with research among nonhuman primates.
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Group cohesion must be permanently (re-)produced by performing religious rituals, by generating collective effervescence towards the totem, and particularly by cultural transmission.
“rather than being guaranteed by an 'innate trait' (Maryanski & Turner, 1992: 66), group cohesion must be permanently (re-)produced by performing religious rituals, by generating collective effervescence towards the totem (Maryanski, 2018: 259), and particularly by cultural transmission (Henrich & Muthukrishna, 2021).”
From Durkheim, Indoctrinability and the Moral Ambivalence of Human Sociality (2026) · cites this paper as Henrich & Muthukrishna, 2021
If there are cues that a person shares the same moral principles, e.g. by religious symbols, we are more inclined to trust this person and to cooperate.
“If there are cues that a person shares the same moral principles, e.g. by religious symbols (Simmel, 1964: 30), we are more inclined to trust this person and to cooperate (Henrich & Muthukrishna, 2021: 230).”
From Durkheim, Indoctrinability and the Moral Ambivalence of Human Sociality (2026) · cites this paper as Henrich & Muthukrishna, 2021
Being neurologically adapted to imitate and to comply with group norms is one example of gene-culture co-evolution.
“Being neurologically adapted to imitate and to comply with group norms is one example of gene-culture co-evolution (Haidt, 2012: 241;Henrich, 2016;Henrich & Muthukrishna, 2021: 226;Richerson & Boyd, 2005).”
From Durkheim, Indoctrinability and the Moral Ambivalence of Human Sociality (2026) · cites this paper as Henrich & Muthukrishna, 2021
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References 217 · Cited by 457
- Authors
- Henrich, J., & Muthukrishna, M.
- Affiliations
- Harvard University (US)
- London School of Economics and Political Science (GB)
- Venue
- Annual Review of Psychology
- Publisher
- Annual Reviews
- Published
- 2021-01-04
- Volume
- 72
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 207-240
- ISSN
- 0066-4308 (ISSN-L)
- 1545-2085
- OpenAlex
- W3090600262
- Cited by
- 457
- References
- 217
- Citations by year
- 2026: 76 · 2025: 93 · 2024: 95 · 2023: 78 · 2022: 65 · 2021: 40 · 2020: 8 · 2019: 1
- FWCI
- 8.32
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Annual Review of Psychology (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- London School of Economics and Political Science Research Online (London School of Economics and Political Science) (acceptedVersion)
- London School of Economics and Political Science Theses Online (London School of Economics and Political Science) (acceptedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
- Social Sciences › Cultural Studies › Language and cultural evolution
- Keywords
- human cooperation, ultrasociality, reciprocity, reputation, signaling, punishment, kin selection, self-domestication, marriage system, cross-cultural variation, non-human primates, evolutionary psychology
- MeSH terms
- Cooperative Behavior, Cultural Evolution, Biological Evolution, Humans, Punishment, Religion
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