The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
OWNERSHIP ORGANIZATION AND FIRM PERFORMANCE
Abstract
▪ Abstract This essay reviews research on the type and degree of fragmentation of firm ownership with an emphasis on the consequences of ownership organization for firm performance. We use a property rights approach to synthesize sociological, organizational, legal, and economic research that has examined the effect of ownership organization on firm performance. Agency theorists generally assume that shareholders are homogenous and that their influence on firm performance is directly proportional to the percentage of equity they hold. However, empirical research following this approach has failed to produce definitive evidence. Class analysis perspectives interpret these inconclusive results as demonstrating that, regardless of ownership organization, firms are run to serve the capitalist class. An alternative interpretation is that shareholders are not homogeneous but that certain types of shareholders use their formal authority, social influence, and expertise to “capture” property rights and strongly influence firm performance. The influence of different types of owners may depend on industry characteristics, and we review literature pointing to a contingency theory of ownership organization.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Power in Top Management Teams: Dimensions, Measurement, and Validation
Finkelstein, S. (1992) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.5465/256485 · Cited by 2,389
Corporate Elite Networks and Governance Changes in the 1980s
Davis, G. F., & Greve, H. R. (1997) · American Journal of Sociology · doi:10.1086/231170 · Cited by 1,237
Cited by
Substitutes or Complements? A Configurational Examination of Corporate Governance Mechanisms
Misangyi, V. F., & Acharya, A. G. (2014) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.5465/amj.2012.0728 · Cited by 771
Miller, D., Le Breton-Miller, I., & Lester, R. H. (2011) · Journal of Management Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-6486.2009.00896.x · Cited by 640
Arora, P., & Dharwadkar, R. (2011) · Corporate Governance: An International Review · doi:10.1111/j.1467-8683.2010.00843.x · Cited by 528
Shareholder Activism: A Multidisciplinary Review
Goranova, M., & Ryan, L. V. (2014) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/0149206313515519 · Cited by 414
Family ownership and acquisition behavior in publicly‐traded companies
Miller, D., Le Breton‐Miller, I., & Lester, R. H. (2010) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.802 · Cited by 392
Metadata
- Authors
- Kang, D. L., & Sørensen, A. B.
- Venue
- Annual Review of Sociology
- Publisher
- Annual Reviews
- Published
- 1999-08
- Volume
- 25
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 121-144
- ISSN
- 0360-0572 (ISSN-L)
- 1545-2115
- OpenAlex
- W2142448355
- Cited by
- 160
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 2.22
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: OWNERSHIP ORGANIZATION AND FIRM PERFORMANCE. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1146/annurev.soc.25.1.121
- The paper
- Kang, D. L., & Sørensen, A. B. (1999). OWNERSHIP ORGANIZATION AND FIRM PERFORMANCE. Annual Review of Sociology. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.25.1.121
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.