The DOI matches its Crossref record; 52 of the 52 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Trade, Democracy, and the Size of the Public Sector: The Political Underpinnings of Openness
Abstract
Politics remains prominently absent in the literature showing that higher levels of trade integration lead to a larger public sector. As openness increases, the state, acting as a social planner, adopts a salient role to minimize the risks of economic integration and secure social peace. Given the highly redistributive nature of both trade and fiscal policies, we claim, however, that the interaction of the international economy and domestic politics leads to three distinct political-economic equilibria. First, nations may embrace protectionist policies to shore up the welfare of key domestic sectors—without engaging, therefore, in substantial public spending. Second, to maintain trade openness in democracies, policymakers develop compensation policies to muster the support of the losers of openness. Finally, given the tax burden of public compensation, pro-free trade sectors may impose an authoritarian regime to exclude (instead of buying off) their opponents. After formally stating the conditions under which each regime emerges, we test the model on a panel data of around sixty-five developing and developed nations in the period 1950–1990 and explore its implications through a set of key historical cases drawn from the last two centuries.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
The three worlds of welfare capitalism
(1990) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.28-1046 · Cited by 16,528
Hsiao, C. (2014) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139839327 · Cited by 7,869
Hsiao, C. (2022) · doi:10.1017/9781009057745 · Cited by 7,869
The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism
Hicks, A., & Esping-Andersen, G. (1991) · Contemporary Sociology · doi:10.2307/2073705 · Cited by 7,092
Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy
Lipset, S. M. (1959) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1951731 · Cited by 7,050
What To Do (and Not to Do) with Time-Series Cross-Section Data
Beck, N., & Katz, J. N. (1995) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2082979 · Cited by 6,840
A Rational Theory of the Size of Government
Meltzer, A. H., & Richard, S. F. (1981) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261013 · Cited by 5,485
Frankel, J. A., & Romer, D. (1999) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.89.3.379 · Cited by 5,384
(2014) · African Studies Companion Online · doi:10.1163/_afco_asc_2253 · Cited by 3,292
Why do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments?
Rodrik, D. (1998) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/250038 · Cited by 3,152
Cited by
Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy for Comparative Research
LIEBERMAN, E. S. (2005) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055405051762 · Cited by 1,515
Hypothesis Testing and Multiplicative Interaction Terms
Braumoeller, B. F. (2004) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818304040251 · Cited by 816
Global Capital and National Governments
Mosley, L. (2001) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511615672 · Cited by 617
Kitschelt, H., Hawkins, K. A., Luna, J. P., Rosas, G., & Zechmeister, E. J. (2010) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511750311 · Cited by 559
Optimal Obfuscation: Democracy and Trade Policy Transparency
KONO, D. Y. (2006) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055406062241 · Cited by 417
Metadata
- Authors
- Adserà, A., & Boix, C.
- Venue
- International Organization
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2002
- Volume
- 56
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 229-262
- ISSN
- 0020-8183 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-5088
- OpenAlex
- W2118277605
- Cited by
- 385
- References
- 52
- FWCI
- 18.11
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Trade, Democracy, and the Size of the Public Sector: The Political Underpinnings of Openness. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1162/002081802320005478
- The paper
- Adserà, A., & Boix, C. (2002). Trade, Democracy, and the Size of the Public Sector: The Political Underpinnings of Openness. International Organization. https://doi.org/10.1162/002081802320005478
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.