The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Separation of Powers and Political Accountability
Open accessAbstract
Political constitutions are incomplete contracts and therefore leave room for abuse of power. In democracies, elections are the primary mechanism for disciplining public officials, but they are not sufficient. Separation of powers between executive and legislative bodies also helps to prevent the abuse of power, but only with appropriate checks and balances. Checks and balances work by creating a conflict of interest between the executive and the legislature, yet requiring both bodies to agree on public policy. In this way, the two bodies discipline each other to the voters' advantage. Under appropriate checks and balances, separation of powers also helps the voters elicit information.
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Citations
Cites
Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
Holmstrom, B. (1999) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00083 · Cited by 3,172
Cited by
Africa's Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions
Easterly, W., & Levine, R. (1997) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355300555466 · Cited by 5,649
Retrospective Voting Reconsidered
Healy, A., & Malhotra, N. (2013) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-032211-212920 · Cited by 667
How to Subvert Democracy: Montesinos in Peru
McMillan, J., & Zoido, P. (2004) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/0895330042632690 · Cited by 475
Transparency, wages, and the separation of powers: An experimental analysis of corruption
Azfar, O., & Nelson, W. R. (2007) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/s11127-006-9101-5 · Cited by 113
Political institutions, voter turnout, and policy outcomes
Fumagalli, E., & Narciso, G. (2012) · European Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2011.10.002 · Cited by 75
Metadata
- Authors
- Persson, T., Roland, G., & Tabellini, G.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1997-11-01
- Volume
- 112
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1163-1202
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4650
- OpenAlex
- W2089003389
- Cited by
- 1,171
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 211.18
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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