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Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm
Abstract
Relational contracts—informal agreements sustained by the value of future relationships—are prevalent within and between firms. We develop repeated-game models showing why and how relational contracts within firms (vertical integration) differ from those between (nonintegration). We show that integration affects the parties' temptations to renege on a given relational contract, and hence affects the best relational contract the parties can sustain. In this sense, the integration decision can be an instrument in the service of the parties' relationship. Our approach also has implications for joint ventures, alliances, and networks, and for the role of management within and between firms.
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Cites
Coase, R. H. (1937) · Economica · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0335.1937.tb00002.x · Cited by 23,972
The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance
Klein, B., & Leffler, K. B. (1981) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260996 · Cited by 3,653
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Agri-food value chain revolutions in low- and middle-income countries
Barrett, C. B., Reardon, T., Swinnen, J., & Zilberman, D. (2022) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.20201539 · Cited by 371
The mirroring hypothesis: theory, evidence, and exceptions
Colfer, L. J., & Baldwin, C. Y. (2016) · Industrial and Corporate Change · doi:10.1093/icc/dtw027 · Cited by 331
Reducing greenhouse gas emissions through operations and supply chain management
Plambeck, E. L. (2012) · Energy Economics · doi:10.1016/j.eneco.2012.08.031 · Cited by 302
Narula, R., Asmussen, C. G., Chi, T., & Kundu, S. K. (2019) · Journal of International Business Studies · doi:10.1057/s41267-019-00260-6 · Cited by 187
Metadata
- Authors
- Baker, G., Gibbons, R., & Murphy, K. J.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2002-02-01
- Volume
- 117
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 39-84
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4650
- OpenAlex
- W3124719057
- Cited by
- 1,730
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 139.60
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
