Incentives for Procrastinators
Abstract
We examine how principals should design incentives to induce time-inconsistent procrastinating agents to complete tasks efficiently. Delay is costly to the principal, but the agent faces stochastic costs of completing the task, and efficiency requires waiting when costs are high. If the principal knows the task-cost distribution, she can always achieve first-best efficiency. If the agent has private information, the principal can induce first-best efficiency for time-consistent agents, but often cannot for procrastinators. We show that second-best optimal incentives for procrastinators typically involve an increasing punishment for delay as time passes.
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The relation between age and less procrastination might owe to the development of higher cognitive functions during adolescence that are essential for self-regulation and goal setting.
“The relation with age might owe to the development of higher cognitive functions during adolescence that are essential for self-regulation and goal setting, explaining the greater number of self-reported procrastinators in the student population (O'Donoghue & Rabin, 1999;Banich, 2009).”
From Understanding and Treating Procrastination: A Review of a Common Self-Regulatory Failure (2014) · cites this paper as O'Donoghue & Rabin, 1999
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References 24 · Cited by 381
- Authors
- O'Donoghue, T., & Rabin, M.
- Affiliations
- University of California, Berkeley (US)
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1999-08-01
- Volume
- 114
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 769-816
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4650
- OpenAlex
- W2170468555
- Cited by
- 381
- References
- 24
- Citations by year
- 2026: 4 · 2025: 8 · 2024: 9 · 2023: 17 · 2022: 12 · 2021: 18 · 2020: 8 · 2019: 12 · 2018: 19 · 2017: 22 · 2016: 21 · 2015: 20 · 2014: 23 · 2013: 9 · 2012: 12
- FWCI
- 10.62
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Econstor (Econstor) (submittedVersion)
- HighWire Press Open Archive (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Keywords
- procrastination, incentive design, time inconsistency, principal-agent problem, task completion, delay cost, private information, first-best efficiency
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