Agency in Natural and Artificial Systems
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
We analyze the conditions for agency in natural and artificial systems. In the case of basic (natural) autonomous systems, self-construction and activity in the environment are two aspects of the same organization, the distinction between which is entirely conceptual: their sensorimotor activities are metabolic, realized according to the same principles and through the same material transformations as those typical of internal processes (such as energy transduction). The two aspects begin to be distinguishable in a particular evolutionary trend, related to the size increase of some groups of organisms whose adaptive abilities depend on motility. Here a specialized system develops, which, in the sensorimotor aspect, is decoupled from the metabolic basis, although it remains dependent on it in the self-constructive aspect. This decoupling reveals a complexification of the organization. In the last section of the article this approach to natural agency is used to analyze artificial systems by posing two problems: whether it is possible to artificially build an organization similar to the natural, and whether this notion of agency can be grounded on different organizing principles.
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Cites
Radical embodiment: neural dynamics and consciousness
Thompson, E., & Varela, F. J. (2001) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/s1364-6613(00)01750-2 · Cited by 1,144
An embodied cognitive science?
Clark, A. (1999) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/s1364-6613(99)01361-3 · Cited by 781 · cited 2×
“Their structure and behavior are designed so that there are ongoing couplings between their bodies (at least in biomechanical terms [12]), their nervous systems, and the environment, so that the robot displays real-time adaptive operation: Their behaviors are embodied, embedded, and situated [10, 11, 42].”
A Universal Definition of Life: Autonomy and Open-Ended Evolution
Ruiz-Mirazo, K., Peretó, J., & Moreno, A. (2004) · Origins of life and evolution of the biosphere · doi:10.1023/b:orig.0000016440.53346.dc · Cited by 393 · cited 1×
“The most transcendental change was probably the introduction of genetic mechanisms to stabilize metabolism [39]—on the one hand, because genetic material allows the production of highly complex proteins (as well as other regulatory factors, as can be seen in [28]), which enhance metabolic plasticity and permit the fin…”
Metabolism and the problem of its universalization
Bergareche, A. M., & Ruiz-Mirazo, K. (1999) · Biosystems · doi:10.1016/s0303-2647(98)00034-3 · Cited by 78
Cited by
Participatory sense-making: An enactive approach to social cognition
De Jaegher, H., & Di Paolo, E. (2007) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-007-9076-9 · Cited by 1,640
“Similar constitutive and interactive properties have been proposed to emerge at different levels of identity-generation, including sensorimotor and neuro-dynamical forms of autonomy (Di Paolo, Rohde and De Jaegher Forthcoming; Moreno and Etxeberria 2005; Thompson 2007; Varela 1979; 1997).”
BackgroundDefining Agency: Individuality, Normativity, Asymmetry, and Spatio-temporality in Action
Barandiaran, X. E., Di Paolo, E., & Rohde, M. (2009) · Adaptive Behavior · doi:10.1177/1059712309343819 · Cited by 497
“…very concept of agency is traced back to the autonomous organization of life making explicit some of the theoretical and philosophical implications (for some later developments see: Barandiaran, 2008; Di Paolo, 2005; Moreno & Etxeberria, 2005; Thompson, 2007; Van Duijn, Keijzer, & Franken, 2006).”
BackgroundHorizons for the Enactive Mind: Values, Social Interaction, and Play
Di Paolo, E. A., Rohde, M., & De Jaegher, H. (2010) · Enaction · doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262014601.003.0003 · Cited by 405
Biological Autonomy: A Philosophical and Theoretical Enquiry
Moreno, A., & Mossio, M. (2015) · History, Philosophy and Theory of the Life Sciences · doi:10.1007/978-94-017-9837-2 · Cited by 397
Self-citationEmbodiment and sense-making in autism
De Jaegher, H. (2013) · Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnint.2013.00015 · Cited by 388
Metadata
- Authors
- Moreno, A., & Etxeberria, A.
- Venue
- Artificial Life
- Publisher
- MIT Press - Journals
- Published
- 2005-01
- Volume
- 11
- Issue
- 1-2
- Pages
- 161-175
- ISSN
- 1064-5462 (ISSN-L)
- 1530-9185
- OpenAlex
- W2114108493
- Cited by
- 114
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 2.80
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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