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Cited by 174

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How Does Product Market Competition Shape Incentive Contracts?

Cuñat, Vicente, Guadalupe, Maria · 2005 · Journal of the European Economic Association

Abstract

This paper studies the effect of product market competition on the explicit compensation packages that firms offer to their CEOs, executives and workers. We use a large sample of both traded and nontraded UK firms and exploit a quasi-natural experiment associated to an increase in competition. The sudden appreciation of the pound in 1996 implied different changes in competition for sectors with different degrees of openness. Our difference in differences estimates show that a higher level of product market competition increases the performance pay sensitivity of compensation schemes, in particular for executives.

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Metadata

Authors
Cuñat, V., & Guadalupe, M.
Venue
Journal of the European Economic Association
Published
2005-09-01
Volume
3
Issue
5
Pages
1058-1082
ISSN
  • 1542-4766 (ISSN-L)
  • 1542-4774
OpenAlex
W1505679671
Cited by
174
References
0
FWCI
38.84
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: How Does Product Market Competition Shape Incentive Contracts? https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1162/1542476054729437
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Cuñat, V., & Guadalupe, M. (2005). How Does Product Market Competition Shape Incentive Contracts? Journal of the European Economic Association. https://doi.org/10.1162/1542476054729437

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.