Transparency as contested political terrain: who knows what about the global GMO trade and why does it matter?
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This article explores the prospects for transparency to be a transformative force in global biosafety governance. It analyzes whether information disclosure can further a right to know and choose, and hence facilitate oversight over transnational transfers of genetically modified organisms (GMOs). It examines the question of “Whose right to know what and why?” with regard to GMOs in the agricultural commodity trade in relation to the global Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. I argue that the limited disclosure obligations in this global context follow rather than shape market developments, and that complex infrastructures of sampling, testing and detection are required to put disclosed information to use. If so, rather than a normative right-to-know of importing countries, a competing norm of caveat emptor (let the buyer beware) prevails. I conclude that the potential of transparency to empower remains unrealized, particularly for the poorest countries most reliant on globally-induced disclosure.
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When transparency is used to increase surveillance, it can push the responsibility and associated cost of compliance to upstream actors that lack resources to adhere to standards or demonstrate sustainable behaviour.
“Thus, when transparency is used to increase surveillance (Gardner et al., 2018), it can also push the responsibility and associated cost of compliance to those upstream actors at the beginning of the supply chain that lack substantial resources to either adhere to the standards or to demonstrate sustainable behaviour already in place (Gupta, 2010;Gebara and Agrawal, 2017).”
From Making deforestation risk visible. Discourses on bovine leather supply chain in Brazil (2020) · cites this paper as Gupta, 2010
In “Making Transparency Work: Sampling, Detection, Verification, Liability,” Gupta says testing and verification are especially challenging for developing countries with limited capacity. But the paper says those countries seek to shift monitoring and testing responsibilities onto exporters; it does not establish that transparency pushes compliance costs onto resource-poor upstream supply-chain actors or discuss demonstrating sustainable behaviour. (LLM, conf=0.84)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredA simplistic understanding of transparency or a blind trust in its inherent goodness may lead to negative implications for livelihoods and sustainability outcomes.
“Our analysis confirms the idea that a simplistic understanding of transparency or a blind trust in its inherent goodness may lead to negative implications for livelihoods and sustainability outcomes (Klintman and Boström, 2008;Gupta, 2010).”
From Making deforestation risk visible. Discourses on bovine leather supply chain in Brazil (2020) · cites this paper as Gupta, 2010
The Introduction (page unavailable) questions the assumption that transparency inherently empowers and says its potential remains unrealized for the poorest developing countries. “Transparency: for Whom and Why?” (page unavailable) describes a threat to those countries’ access to markets for traditional agricultural exports, supporting the concern about livelihoods. The paper does not establish negative sustainability outcomes as such, so that part of the claim is not supported. (LLM, conf=0.82)
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Cites
Dingwerth, K., & Eichinger, M. (2010) · Global Environmental Politics · doi:10.1162/glep_a_00015 · Cited by 234 · see citing works
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Cited by
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Dingwerth, K., & Eichinger, M. (2010) · Global Environmental Politics · doi:10.1162/glep_a_00015 · Cited by 234 · see citing works
Making deforestation risk visible. Discourses on bovine leather supply chain in Brazil
Mammadova, A., Behagel, J., & Masiero, M. (2020) · Geoforum · doi:10.1016/j.geoforum.2020.03.008 · Cited by 26 · see citing works
- Authors
- Gupta, A.
- Affiliations
- Wageningen University & Research (NL)
- Corresponding author
- Gupta, Aarti
- ORCID
- Gupta, Aarti
- Venue
- Global Environmental Politics
- Publisher
- MIT Press - Journals
- Published
- 2010-08
- Volume
- 10
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 32-52
- ISSN
- 1526-3800 (ISSN-L)
- 1536-0091
- OpenAlex
- W2125625847
- Cited by
- 60
- References
- 1
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1 · 2025: 2 · 2024: 1 · 2023: 5 · 2022: 11 · 2021: 1 · 2020: 2 · 2019: 2 · 2018: 3 · 2016: 2 · 2014: 8 · 2013: 7 · 2012: 2
- FWCI
- 8.46
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
- doi.org
- Locations
- Global Environmental Politics (publishedVersion)
- Socio-Environmental Systems Modeling (acceptedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Project Muse (Johns Hopkins University) (submittedVersion)
- Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Agricultural and Biological Sciences › Plant Science › Genetically Modified Organisms Research
- Physical Sciences › Environmental Science › Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law › International Environmental Law and Policies
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Regulation and Compliance Studies
- Keywords
- transparency, genetically modified organisms, biosafety governance, Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, information disclosure, right to know, GMO trade, agricultural commodity trade, caveat emptor, developing countries, global governance
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