The DOI matches its Crossref record; 34 of the 34 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Learning to Deter: Deterrence Failure and Success in the Israel-Hezbollah Conflict, 2006–16
Abstract
What are the sources of deterrence stability and under what conditions can weak actors deter stronger adversaries? To deter a superior adversary, the weak actor must convince it that if conflict breaks out, the weak actor would be capable of rendering its opponent's strategic capabilities tactical and its own tactical capabilities strategic. The deterrence relationship that has evolved between Israel and the Lebanese Hezbollah in the decade since—and as a result of—the 2006 Lebanon War (a.k.a. the Second Lebanon War or the July War) confirms this observation. A comparison of these two actors’ deterrence behavior in the years preceding the war and in its aftermath shows that one of the leading explanations for the ongoing stability along the Israeli-Lebanese border is that Israel and Hezbollah have learned to apply deterrence in a manner that meets the prerequisites of rational deterrence theory.
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“One critical case in which deterrence actually does seem to hold, demonstrating the concept ' s continued relevance and signi fi cance, is that of Israel and Hezbollah since the 2006 war.”
From Iran’s Syria Strategy: The Evolution of Deterrence (2021) · cites this paper as Sobelman 2017
In the citing paper
“It was not until the summer of 2012 that General Mohammad Ali Jafaari, head of the IRGC, admitted a Quds Force presence in Syria.”
From Iran’s Syria Strategy: The Evolution of Deterrence (2021) · cites this paper as [79]
Citations
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Cited by
Iran's Syria strategy: the evolution of deterrence
Ahmadian, H., & Mohseni, P. (2019) · International Affairs · doi:10.1093/ia/iiy271 · Cited by 44
US cyber deterrence: Practice guiding theory
Wilner, A. S. (2019) · Journal of Strategic Studies · doi:10.1080/01402390.2018.1563779 · Cited by 48
Coercive disclosure: The weaponization of public intelligence revelation in international relations
Riemer, O., & Sobelman, D. (2023) · Contemporary Security Policy · doi:10.1080/13523260.2022.2164122 · Cited by 33
Self-citationGazit, O. (2020) · Political Psychology · doi:10.1111/pops.12703 · Cited by 21
Darwich, M., Valbjørn, M., Salloukh, B. F., Hazbun, W., Samra, A. A., Saddiki, S., Saouli, A., Albloshi, H. H., & Makdisi, K. (2020) · International Studies Perspectives · doi:10.1093/isp/ekaa020 · Cited by 21
Metadata
- Authors
- Sobelman, D.
- Affiliations
- Harvard University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Sobelman, Daniel
- ORCID
- Sobelman, Daniel
- Venue
- International Security
- Publisher
- MIT Press - Journals
- Published
- 2017-01
- Volume
- 41
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 151-196
- ISSN
- 0162-2889 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4804
- OpenAlex
- W2584041267
- Cited by
- 60
- References
- 34
- Citations by year
- 2026: 14 · 2025: 1 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 28 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 1 · 2020: 4 · 2019: 5 · 2018: 2 · 2017: 1
- FWCI
- 15.96
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- International Security (publishedVersion)
- Project Muse (Johns Hopkins University) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › International Relations and Foreign Policy
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Middle East Politics and Society
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Political Conflict and Governance
- Keywords
- deterrence, deterrence stability, deterrence failure, Israel, Hezbollah, 2006 Lebanon War, asymmetric deterrence, strategic capabilities
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