The DOI matches its Crossref record; 20 of the 20 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Liar's Loan? Effects of Origination Channel and Information Falsification on Mortgage Delinquency
Open accessAbstract
This paper presents an analysis of mortgage delinquency between 2004 and 2008 using a loan-level data set from a major national mortgage bank. Our analysis highlights two problems underlying the mortgage crisis: a reliance on mortgage brokers who tend to originate lower-quality loans and a prevalence of low-documentation loans—known in the industry as “liar's loans”—that result in borrower information falsification. While over three-quarters of the difference in delinquency rates between bank and broker channels can be attributed to observable loan and borrower characteristics, the delinquency difference between full- and low-documentation mortgages is due to unobservable heterogeneity, about half of it potentially due to income falsification.
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Citations
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Cited by
Mayer, C., Pence, K., & Sherlund, S. M. (2009) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.23.1.27 · Cited by 720
Screening Peers Softly: Inferring the Quality of Small Borrowers
Iyer, R., Khwaja, A. I., Luttmer, E. F. P., & Shue, K. (2016) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2015.2181 · Cited by 620
The role of institutional investors in propagating the crisis of 2007–2008
Manconi, A., Massa, M., & Yasuda, A. (2012) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.05.011 · Cited by 317
Loan Originations and Defaults in the Mortgage Crisis: The Role of the Middle Class
Adelino, M., Schoar, A., & Severino, F. (2016) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhw018 · Cited by 311
Why Do Borrowers Make Mortgage Refinancing Mistakes?
Agarwal, S., Rosen, R. J., & Yao, V. (2016) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2015.2272 · Cited by 173
Metadata
- Authors
- Jiang, W., Nelson, A. A., & Vytlacil, E.
- Venue
- The Review of Economics and Statistics
- Publisher
- MIT Press
- Published
- 2014-03-01
- Volume
- 96
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-18
- ISSN
- 0034-6535 (ISSN-L)
- 1530-9142
- OpenAlex
- W3121768221
- Cited by
- 278
- References
- 20
- FWCI
- 55.86
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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