Elections in Rural China: Competition Without Parties
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Village elections in China present scholars with the case of a single-party regime that allows voters to reject candidates regularly. Using a micro survey of 698 voters in 30 rural election districts, the authors demonstrate that when some candidates can lose, voters participate. A comparison of models of voter turnout and running for office further demonstrates that even when competition is structured to the benefit of party members, the perception of competition as choice between candidates is sufficient to engage voters and increase their perception that the electoral process is fair. These findings hold regardless of a respondent’s age, gender, membership in the Communist Party and Youth League, and general knowledge level and access to media. Village wealth and geographical isolation also do not demonstrate a strong substantive impact. One theoretical implication of these findings is that contested elections in authoritarian regimes may simultaneously strengthen demand for accountability and loyalty to the regime.
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Citations
Cites
Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990
Przeworski, A., Alvarez, M. E., Cheibub, J. A., & Limongi, F. (2000) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511804946 · Cited by 2,845
Cited by
Consultative Authoritarianism and Its Limits
Truex, R. (2017) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414014534196 · Cited by 315
Conditional Receptivity to Citizen Participation: Evidence From a Survey Experiment in China
Meng, T., Pan, J., & Yang, P. (2017) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414014556212 · Cited by 180
“Although Chinese citizens do express their preferences to the state through formal and informal channels on a large variety of topics (Cho, 2008; Cheng, 2011; Gui & Cui, 2000; Gong, 2008; Landry et al., 2010; Liu, 2003; Ren, 2005; Tang & Chen, 2003; Shi, 1997; Tao, 2006; Xiang & Song, 1997; Yu, 2007; Zhong & Mol, 2007…”
BackgroundThe Single‐Party Dictator's Dilemma: Information in Elections without Opposition
MALESKY, E., & SCHULER, P. (2011) · Legislative Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1111/j.1939-9162.2011.00025.x · Cited by 160
Thiem, A., Baumgartner, M., & Bol, D. (2016) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414014565892 · Cited by 138
“Gleditsch (1995), for instance, maintains that “nuclear deterrence may be interpreted as a sufficient condition for peace” (p. 543), and Landry, Davis, and Wang (2010) argue that electoral “competition defined as choice between candidates still is sufficient to engage voters” (p. 782).”
BackgroundChen, J. (2018) · Transcultural Psychiatry · doi:10.1177/1363461518792741 · Cited by 56
Metadata
- Authors
- Landry, P. F., Davis, D., & Wang, S.
- Venue
- Comparative Political Studies
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2010-03-08
- Volume
- 43
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 763-790
- ISSN
- 0010-4140 (ISSN-L)
- 1552-3829
- OpenAlex
- W2014100562
- Cited by
- 85
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 18.90
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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