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Interest Arbitration, Outcomes, and the Incentive to Bargain
Abstract
"This study develops a model of bargaining that demonstrates that an interest arbitration procedure will encourage negotiated settlements to the extent that risk aversion dominates the preferences of the parties and there is uncertainty regarding the arbitrator's behavior. The authors conclude that it is likely that risk aversion does dominate preferences, but the evidence is not conclusive. They also argue that uncertainty may be reduced over time for various reasons, leading to increased use of arbitration and a convergence between the terms of negotiated and arbitrated agreements."
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Citations
Cited by
(1995) · CaltechAUTHORS (California Institute of Technology) · Cited by 560
THE EFFECTS OF FRAMING AND NEGOTIATOR OVERCONFIDENCE ON BARGAINING BEHAVIORS AND OUTCOMES.
Neale, M. A., & Bazerman, M. H. (1985) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.2307/256060 · Cited by 502
Collective Bargaining and Industrial Relations
Ashenfelter, O. (1982) · Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society · doi:10.1111/j.1468-232x.1982.tb00216.x · Cited by 349
Models of conflict, negotiation and third party intervention: A review and synthesis
Lewicki, R. J., Weiss, S. E., & Lewin, D. (1992) · Journal of Organizational Behavior · doi:10.1002/job.4030130303 · Cited by 326
Chapter 18 The analysis of union behavior
Farber, H. S. (1986) · Handbook of Labor Economics · doi:10.1016/s1573-4463(86)02008-4 · Cited by 313
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Farber, H. S., & Katz, H. C.
- Venue
- ILR Review
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 1979-10
- Volume
- 33
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 55-63
- ISSN
- 0019-7939 (ISSN-L)
- 2162-271X
- OpenAlex
- W2030420197
- Cited by
- 182
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 37.79
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.