Focal Points, Dissident Calendars, and Preemptive Repression
Abstract
This article explains temporal variation in repression as a function of the “dissident calendar,” the set of events that serve as natural focal points for coordination. The core argument is that regimes can anticipate the events that create these focal points and engage in preemptive repression to survive their passing. This dynamic produces predictable, often cyclical patterns in repression. An analysis of dissident detentions in China from 1998 to 2014 shows that “focal events” alone appear to be responsible for more than 20 percent of dissident detentions over the analysis period. Such detentions tend to be shorter and rely less on formal criminal procedures, suggesting a “catch-and-release” dynamic. Additional analysis of detentions in Tibet shows how the calendar may vary by issue or group.
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Mobilization organized through public coordination is repressed using that very same public information.
“research has shown how mobilization organized through public coordination is repressed using that very same public information-for instance, repression is preemptively increased before focal days (Truex 2019); and autocracies censor online calls for collective action (King, Pan, and Roberts 2013), coerce online opinion leaders (Pan and Siegel 2020), and at times, turn off the internet entirely.”
From Coordinated Dis-Coordination (2024) · cites this paper as Truex 2019
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References 36 · Cited by 134
- Authors
- Truex, R.
- Affiliations
- Princeton University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Truex, Rory
- ORCID
- Truex, Rory
- Venue
- Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2018-04-24
- Volume
- 63
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1032-1052
- ISSN
- 0022-0027 (ISSN-L)
- 1552-8766
- OpenAlex
- W3125233458
- Cited by
- 134
- References
- 36
- Citations by year
- 2026: 10 · 2025: 41 · 2024: 17 · 2023: 13 · 2022: 12 · 2021: 14 · 2020: 10 · 2019: 2 · 2018: 13 · 2017: 2
- FWCI
- 22.19
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Journal of Conflict Resolution (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Princeton University
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Political Conflict and Governance
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › China's Socioeconomic Reforms and Governance
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › International Relations and Foreign Policy
- Keywords
- political repression, catch and release, regime survival, Tibet, China, dissidents
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