Cited by 35Political Conflict and GovernanceChina's Socioeconomic Reforms and GovernanceHong Kong and Taiwan Politics

Focal Moments and Protests in Autocracies: How Pro-democracy Anniversaries Shape Dissent in China

Carter, Erin Baggott, Carter, Brett L.·2020·Journal of Conflict Resolution

Abstract

Social scientists have long observed that focal points enable citizens to coordinate collective action. For antiregime protests in autocracies, however, focal points also enable repressive governments to prepare in advance. We propose a theory to explain when citizens are likely to employ focal points to organize antiregime protests. Our key insight is that tacit coordination is most critical when explicit coordination is costly. Empirically, we use our theory to identify a setting where focal points are likely to be salient and then argue that the anniversaries of failed pro-democracy movements satisfy conditions for focality. In China, we find that the anniversaries of failed pro-democracy movements occasion nearly 30 percent more protests than any other day. Protests during pro-democracy anniversaries are more likely to employ “rights-conscious” discourse, which scholars have argued is code for democratic resistance, and to be repressed by the government. We find no similar trends for other holidays.

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  • We should expect dissidents in regimes with stronger security apparatuses to follow public coordination to a greater extent or innovate other forms of collective action altogether.

    “We should expect dissidents in regimes with stronger security apparatuses to follow public coordination to a greater extent (Carter and Carter 2020; Chau, Hassan, and Little 2022) or innovate other forms of collective action altogether (Fu 2017; 2018).”

    From Coordinated Dis-Coordination (2024) · cites this paper as Carter and Carter 2020

  • Dissidents organizing against a strong regime will likely find that the resulting friction from dis-coordination is not worth the gains because the regime can quickly adapt to dissidents' innovations.

    “Returning to this paper's second scope condition, dissidents organizing against a strong regime will likely find that the resulting friction from dis-coordination is not worth the gains because the regime can quickly adapt to dissidents' innovations (Carter and Carter 2020; Chau, Hassan, and Little 2022).”

    From Coordinated Dis-Coordination (2024) · cites this paper as Carter and Carter 2020

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References 73 · Cited by 35

Authors
Carter, E. B., & Carter, B. L.
Affiliations
University of Southern California (US)
Corresponding author
Carter, Erin Baggott
Venue
Journal of Conflict Resolution
Published
2020-06-04
Volume
64
Issue
10
Pages
1796-1827
ISSN
  • 0022-0027 (ISSN-L)
  • 1552-8766
OpenAlex
W3033132729
Cited by
35
References
73
Citations by year
2026: 1 · 2025: 16 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 5 · 2022: 6 · 2021: 2 · 2017: 1
FWCI
4.34
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Journal of Conflict Resolution (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Political Conflict and Governance
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › China's Socioeconomic Reforms and Governance
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Hong Kong and Taiwan Politics
Keywords
focal points, authoritarian regimes, tacit coordination, collective action, protest repression, Chinese politics

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