Cited by 220Game Theory and ApplicationsInternational Relations and Foreign PolicyConflict Management and Negotiation

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 30 of the 31 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

The strategy of conflict . Prospectus for a reorientation of game theory

Schelling, Thomas C.·1958·Journal of Conflict Resolution

Abstract

tual dependence-the non-zero-sum involved in wars and threats of war, strikes, negotiations, criminal deterrence, class war, race war, price war, and blackmail; maneuvering in a bureaucracy or a social hierarchy or in a traffic jam; and the coercion of one's own children-traditional game theory has not yielded comparable insight or advice. These are the games in which, though the element of conflict provides the dramatic interest, mutual dependence is part of the logical structure and demands some kind of collaboration or mutual ac-

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Research works printed but not linked: 18

  1. Collier, John. "Wet Saturday." In Short Stories from the "New Yorker ," pp. 171-78. London, 1951.
  2. Deutsch, M. Conditions Affecting Cooperation, pp. 113-14. Naval Research Contract, NONR-285 (10). Research Center for Human Relations, New York University, February, 1957.
  3. Duffus, R.L., 1929, New Republic, 27, 166
  4. Dulles, J.F., 1957, Foreign Affairs
  5. 1954, The New York Times, 29, 4
  6. Goffman, Erving., 1955, Psychiatry: Journal for the Study of Interpersonal Processes
  7. Harsanyi, J., 1956, Econometrica
  8. Marschak, J., Cowles Foundation Papers
  9. Marschak, J., Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Economics
  10. Marschak, J., Cowles Foundation Papers
  11. Moore, O.K., 1956, Game Theory and Social Interaction. Office of Naval Research, Technical Report, Contract No. SAR/NONR-609 (16)
  12. Nash, J.F., 1950, Econometrica
  13. 1957, The New York Times, 16
  14. 1957, The New York Times, 14L
  15. Schelling, T.C., 1956, American Economic Review
  16. 1958, For the Abandonment of Symmetry in the Theory of Co-operative Games
  17. 1958, Reinterpretation of the Solution Concept for "Non-Co-operative" Games
  18. Sherif, M., 1947, The Development of Social Norms

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Metadata

Authors
Schelling, T. C.
Affiliations
Harvard University (US)
Corresponding author
Schelling, Thomas C.
Venue
Journal of Conflict Resolution
Published
1958-09
Volume
2
Issue
3
Pages
203-264
ISSN
  • 0022-0027 (ISSN-L)
  • 1552-8766
OpenAlex
W2065820855
Cited by
220
References
31
Citations by year
2026: 11 · 2025: 11 · 2024: 13 · 2023: 17 · 2022: 12 · 2021: 7 · 2020: 11 · 2019: 26 · 2018: 4 · 2017: 3 · 2016: 4 · 2015: 5 · 2014: 6 · 2013: 7 · 2012: 5
FWCI
8.34
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Journal of Conflict Resolution (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › International Relations and Foreign Policy
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management › Conflict Management and Negotiation
Keywords
game theory, non-zero-sum games, interdependence, conflict, negotiation, deterrence, bargaining, cooperation

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