The DOI matches its Crossref record; 30 of the 31 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The strategy of conflict . Prospectus for a reorientation of game theory
Abstract
tual dependence-the non-zero-sum involved in wars and threats of war, strikes, negotiations, criminal deterrence, class war, race war, price war, and blackmail; maneuvering in a bureaucracy or a social hierarchy or in a traffic jam; and the coercion of one's own children-traditional game theory has not yielded comparable insight or advice. These are the games in which, though the element of conflict provides the dramatic interest, mutual dependence is part of the logical structure and demands some kind of collaboration or mutual ac-
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“In repeated settings, selfish recipients will maximize their own payoff in the short run, but it is in the collective long-term interest to ensure that obligations are met, in order to sustain future allocation12,13.”
From Deep reinforcement learning can promote sustainable human behaviour in a common-pool resource problem (2025) · cites this paper as [12]
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Research works printed but not linked: 18
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Ochoa, R. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198798460.002.0004
Ochoa, R. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198798460.002.0005
Climate, nuclear weapons control and cyber threats: three problems or one?
Севостьянов, П. И., & Mizin, V. (2024) · Полис Политические исследования · doi:10.17976/jpps/2024.03.03
Estimating the value of investments in militaristic deterrence
Mayberry, A. A., & Hicks, D. (2026) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107560
Does Confidence in the President Influence Asset Liquidity?Preprint
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Jeong, D., & Kim, J. Y. (2025) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.5195628
Mind over Matériel: Peace Research, Conflict Data, and the Politics of Quantification
Anderson, G. (2025) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-89331-5_2
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Grund, C., & Monschau, P. (2025) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.5404997
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Lopes, N. J., Rodríguez, I., Etayo, C., & Reutskaja, E. (2026) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-026-55593-8
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Animashaun, M. A. (2026) · Journal of Central and Eastern European African Studies · doi:10.12700/jceeas.2025.5.4.422
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Metadata
- Authors
- Schelling, T. C.
- Affiliations
- Harvard University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Schelling, Thomas C.
- Venue
- Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 1958-09
- Volume
- 2
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 203-264
- ISSN
- 0022-0027 (ISSN-L)
- 1552-8766
- OpenAlex
- W2065820855
- Cited by
- 220
- References
- 31
- Citations by year
- 2026: 11 · 2025: 11 · 2024: 13 · 2023: 17 · 2022: 12 · 2021: 7 · 2020: 11 · 2019: 26 · 2018: 4 · 2017: 3 · 2016: 4 · 2015: 5 · 2014: 6 · 2013: 7 · 2012: 5
- FWCI
- 8.34
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Journal of Conflict Resolution (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › International Relations and Foreign Policy
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management › Conflict Management and Negotiation
- Keywords
- game theory, non-zero-sum games, interdependence, conflict, negotiation, deterrence, bargaining, cooperation
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