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How a War Ends: A Rational Model Approach
Abstract
This article discusses the necessary conditions for two countries at war to come to a settlement and explores how domestic and military costs, time preferences and attitudes toward risk affect the timing and the outcome of the peace. It views the termination of war as a process of rational calculations by the participants; unless both sides believe that they can be made better off by a settlement, the war will continue. An important result of this approach is that a reduction of hostilities may reduce the probability of a settlement taking place and thus prolong the war. It is also shown that increasing the probability of winning may not increase the probability of a settlement and that a country which only values the present need not be at a disadvantage in the negotiation.
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Citations
Cited by
Inequality, Grievances, and Civil War
Cederman, L.-E., Gleditsch, K. S., & Buhaug, H. (2013) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139084161 · Cited by 978
Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict
Lake, D. A., & Rothchild, D. (1996) · International Security · doi:10.1162/isec.21.2.41 · Cited by 698
Powell, R. (2006) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818306060061 · Cited by 585
The analytics of continuing conflict
Hirshleifer, J. (1988) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/bf00869589 · Cited by 332
Ethnicity, the State, and the Duration of Civil War
Wucherpfennig, J., Metternich, N. W., Cederman, L.-E., & Gleditsch, K. S. (2012) · World Politics · doi:10.1017/s004388711100030x · Cited by 284
Metadata
- Authors
- Wittman, D.
- Venue
- Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 1979-12
- Volume
- 23
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 743-763
- ISSN
- 0022-0027 (ISSN-L)
- 1552-8766
- OpenAlex
- W2321906466
- Cited by
- 261
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 14.73
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: How a War Ends: A Rational Model Approach. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1177/002200277902300408
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- Wittman, D. (1979). How a War Ends: A Rational Model Approach. Journal of Conflict Resolution. https://doi.org/10.1177/002200277902300408
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
