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Exit Threats and Cooperation under Anonymity
Abstract
A strategy contest in an iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with an exit option after each game is developed. The whole model is assumed to represent the conditions for egoistical cooperation in a large and anonymous society, which is based mainly on exchange relationships and voluntary cooperation between individuals; therefore, it is appropriate for studying the social stability of free markets. The strategies have no memory, effects of reputation do not exist, and defectors cannot be identified, traced, and held responsible for their actions. This scenario abandons the preconditions usually regarded as necessary for establishing cooperation. Nevertheless, egoistical cooperation may emerge in this model. It turns out that egoistical cooperation is much more robust than realized by most game-theoretical and sociological analyses.
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Citations
Cites
Rational Behaviour and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations
Harsanyi, J. C. (1977) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511571756 · Cited by 1,431
Cited by
Social dilemmas: the anatomy of cooperation
Kollock, P. (1998) · Annual Review of Sociology · doi:10.1146/annurev.soc.24.1.183 · Cited by 1,746
Sumpter, D. J. T. (2010) · doi:10.1515/9781400837106 · Cited by 914
Tanimoto, J., & Sagara, H. (2007) · Biosystems · doi:10.1016/j.biosystems.2006.07.005 · Cited by 366
Know when to walk away: contingent movement and the evolution of cooperation
Aktipis, C. A. (2004) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2004.06.020 · Cited by 298
The Emergence of Generalized Exchange
Takahashi, N. (2000) · American Journal of Sociology · doi:10.1086/210400 · Cited by 290
Metadata
- Authors
- Schuessler, R.
- Venue
- Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 1989-12
- Volume
- 33
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 728-749
- ISSN
- 0022-0027 (ISSN-L)
- 1552-8766
- OpenAlex
- W2026712857
- Cited by
- 184
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 8.48
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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