The DOI matches its Crossref record; 21 of the 21 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Fiscal Policy: Institutions versus Rules
Open accessAbstract
Fiscal discipline is as much needed as monetary discipline. Many countries have attempted to counter the deficit bias by adopting fiscal rules that typically set a limit to their annual budget deficits. The record is not satisfactory; rules are either too lax or too tight and then ignored. This article suggests that the solution is to adopt the approach followed by inflation targeting central banks, with great success. Independent and accountable Fiscal Policy Committees, given the task of achieving debt targets and the authority to decide - or recommend - annual deficits, will be free from the deficit bias. This will allow them to exercise discretion in the short run while delivering debt sustainability in the long run.
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Cites
Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans
Kydland, F. E., & Prescott, E. C. (1977) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260580 · Cited by 7,905
Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?
Barro, R. J. (1974) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260266 · Cited by 5,994
The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective
Clarida, R., Galí, J., & Gertler, M. (1999) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.37.4.1661 · Cited by 4,916
Expectations and the neutrality of money
Lucas, R. E. (1972) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(72)90142-1 · Cited by 4,740
The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy
Buchanan, J., & Tullock, G. (1960) · University of Michigan Press eBooks · doi:10.3998/mpub.7687 · Cited by 3,595
The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy.
Meade, J. E., Buchanan, J. M., & Tullock, G. (1963) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2228407 · Cited by 3,361
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Interest and Prices: Foundations of a Theory of Monetary Policy
Woodford, M. (2004) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9781400830169 · Cited by 2,436
"Rational" Expectations, the Optimal Monetary Instrument, and the Optimal Money Supply Rule
Sargent, T. J., & Wallace, N. (1975) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260321 · Cited by 2,168
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Cited by
Tied to the mast? National fiscal rules in the European Union
Debrun, X., Moulin, L., Turrini, A., Ayuso-i-Casals, J., & Kumar, M. S. (2008) · Economic Policy · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0327.2008.00199.x · Cited by 477
Hallerberg, M., Rainer Strauch, R., & von Hagen, J. (2009) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511759505 · Cited by 405
(2011) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 27
Metadata
- Authors
- Wyplosz, C.
- Venue
- National Institute Economic Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2005-01
- Volume
- 191
- Pages
- 64-78
- ISSN
- 0027-9501 (ISSN-L)
- 1741-3036
- OpenAlex
- W2157480652
- Cited by
- 411
- References
- 21
- FWCI
- 81.59
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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