The DOI matches its Crossref record; 19 of the 19 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Integrity of Corrupt States: Graft as an Informal State Institution
Abstract
This article argues that corrupt practices such as bribery and embezzlement, which scholars have previously assumed to be evidence of the breakdown of the state, may reinforce the state's administrative hierarchies under certain conditions. Drawing on a cross-national analysis of 132 countries and a detailed examination of the informal institutions of official graft in Ukraine, the article finds that where graft is systematically tracked, monitored, and granted by state leaders as an informal payment in exchange for compliance, it provides both an added incentive to obey leaders' directives and the potent sanction of criminal prosecution in the event of disobedience. Where graft is informally institutionalized in this way, it provides the basis for state organizations that are effective at collecting taxes, maintaining public order, and repressing political opposition but that may undermine the development of liberal politics.
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Cites
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Armstrong, J. S. (1996) · International Journal of Forecasting · doi:10.1016/0169-2070(96)88197-0 · Cited by 9,923
Elections Without Democracy: The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism
Levitsky, S., & Way, L. A. (2002) · Journal of Democracy · doi:10.1353/jod.2002.0026 · Cited by 2,711
Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues
Bardhan, P. (2017) · Political Corruption · doi:10.4324/9781315126647-30 · Cited by 2,616
Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research
Skocpol, T. (1985) · Bringing the State Back In · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511628283.002 · Cited by 2,370
Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers
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(2024) · Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.56347/jle · Cited by 919
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New World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction
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Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Change
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Cited by
What Is Quality of Government? A Theory of Impartial Government Institutions
ROTHSTEIN, B., & TEORELL, J. (2008) · Governance · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0491.2008.00391.x · Cited by 1,446
Ordering Power: Contentious Politics and Authoritarian Leviathans in Southeast Asia.
Slater, D. (2013) · ASEAN ECONOMIC BULLETIN · doi:10.1355/ae30-2h · Cited by 585
Leviathan’s Latent Dimensions: Measuring State Capacity for Comparative Political Research
Hanson, J. K., & Sigman, R. (2021) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1086/715066 · Cited by 414
Unwritten Rules: Informal Institutions in Established Democracies
Azari, J. R., & Smith, J. K. (2012) · Perspectives on Politics · doi:10.1017/s1537592711004890 · Cited by 277
Metadata
- Authors
- Darden, K.
- Venue
- Politics & Society
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2008-03
- Volume
- 36
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 35-59
- ISSN
- 0032-3292 (ISSN-L)
- 1552-7514
- OpenAlex
- W2079136642
- Cited by
- 268
- References
- 19
- FWCI
- 24.39
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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