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The Two Settings of Kind and Wicked Learning Environments

Hogarth, Robin M., Lejarraga, Tomás, Soyer, Emre·2015·Current Directions in Psychological Science

Abstract

Inference involves two settings: In the first, information is acquired (learning); in the second, it is applied (predictions or choices). Kind learning environments involve close matches between the informational elements in the two settings and are a necessary condition for accurate inferences. Wicked learning environments involve mismatches. This conceptual framework facilitates identifying sources of inferential errors and can be used, among other things, to suggest how to target corrective procedures. For example, structuring learning environments to be kind improves probabilistic judgments. Potentially, it could also enable economic agents to exhibit maximizing behavior.

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  • Hiring is close to a textbook wicked learning environment: outcomes for rejected candidates are never observed, outcomes for those hired are confounded by onboarding, manager quality, and team composition, and feedback arrives 6 to 18 months late.

    “Hiring is close to a textbook wicked learning environment.Outcomes for rejected candidates are never observed, outcomes for those hired are confounded by onboarding, manager quality, and team composition, and feedback arrives 6 to 18 months late [41,42].”

    From Borrowed Competence: When AI-Driven HR Builds Startups’ People Capability and When It Hollows It Out (2026) · cites this paper as [41]

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Authors
Hogarth, R. M., Lejarraga, T., & Soyer, E.
Affiliations
  • Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra
  • Center for Adaptive Rationality, Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin, Germany
  • Faculty of Business, Ozyegin University
Venue
Current Directions in Psychological Science
Published
2015-10
Volume
24
Issue
5
Pages
379-385
ISSN
  • 0963-7214
  • 1467-8721
Cited by
142
References
5
Language
en

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