Two Distinct Concepts: Party Competition in Government and Electoral Competition in the American States

“17 As is customary, these measures are smoothed into rolling averages across three election cycles (e.g., Ranney 1976; Shufeldt and Flavin 2012), but I lag them in statistical models such that they capture electoral competition in the three previous election cycles prior to the state ’ s democratic…”

“…Ranney’s emphasis on control over state governing institutions (as opposed to contesting and winning legislative district elections) is more congruent with our theory and the types of trespassing and party branding activities that drive it (Holbrook and Van Dunk 1993; Shufeldt and Flavin 2012).”

“…showing that the correlation is positive, but that—consistent with evidence suggesting competition in elections and competition in government are inherently different concepts (Shufeldt and Flavin 2012)—the relationship between partisan control and coalitional stability is substantially noisier.”

“We use the folded Ranney Index (four-years moving average) ranging from 0.5 (no competition) to one (perfect competition) (Shufeldt and Flavin 2012).”

“Party competition refers to interparty competition in government partisan control; electoral competition captures competition in district-level state legislative elections (Shufeldt & Flavin, 2012).”

“As Shufeldt and Flavin (2012) explain, the correlation between the Ranney index and Holbrook and Van Dunk index is historically positive; however, there is a divergence between the two in the period we analyse, indicating distinct concepts.”

“Drawing upon the bestknown examples of each line of inquiry, Shufeldt and Flavin (2012) describe the difference this way: the Ranney index and its descendants measure “competition between parties for control of state government”while Holbrook andVanDunk (and others) measure “competition between…”

“Holbrook and Van Dunk (1993) offered the measure of electoral competition based on district-level state legislative elections in 1980s, and Shufeldt and Flavin (2012) updated the data based on elections since 1990s.”

“The ideological signals from state legislatures have arguably only sharpened in a time of increased party polarization (Shor and McCarty 2011) and sometimes only limited electoral competition (Shufeldt and Flavin 2012).”

“However, Shufeldt and Flavin (2012) make the case that the Ranney Index does not capture within-district electoral competition.”

“Efforts have been made to upgrade the index (Shufeldt and Flavin 2012).”

“Conceptually, the two measures tap different ways in which competition could impact policy liberalism (Shufeldt and Flavin 2012).”

“Utilizing the Holbrook and VanDunk measure of competition as calculated by Shufeldt and Flavin (2012), states were eliminated if not competitive during 2010, 2012, 2014, or 2016.”

“I include the Ranney index calculated by Klarner (2013), which weighs the percentage of seats under Democratic control, voteshare of the Democratic gubernatorial candidate, and the percentage of time Democrats have unified control to estimate party competitiveness (Shufeldt & Flavin, 2012).”

“The Holbrook and Van Dunk measure is based on the average percentage of votes for the winner from each district, the average margin of victory of the winner from each district, the percent of uncontested seats, and the percent of safe seats (Shufeldt & Flavin, 2012).”

“An alternative variable to measuring electoral competition, developed by Holbrook and Van Dunk (1993) and calculated and averaged for the 1990s by Shufeldt and Flavin (2012), incorporates the average vote of electoral winners, average margins of victory, and the percent of safe and uncontested…”

“Shufeldt and Flavin (2012) also point out that a state can have competitive legislative elections and still be firmly controlled by either the Democratic or Republican Party.”

“For the second hypothesis, state-level electoral competitiveness is measured using the Holbrook and Van Dunk (HVD) index, which has been generally relied on as a measure of the degree of electoral competition at the state-level (Shufeldt and Flavin 2012).”

“Empirically, the folded Ranney (1976) index is more volatile and captures the post-1994 Republican gains in governmental control (i.e., a major increase in elite rivalry) missed by the electoral pressure index (Shufeldt & Flavin, 2012).”

“Indeed, there are strong reasons ex ante to expect machine monopolies in New York State as it has a long, impactful history of political machines (in both New York City and Albany), a fragmented local political structure, and relatively strong political parties (see, e.g., Shufeldt and Flavin 2012).”

“Second, the folded Ranney (1976) index is more empirically volatile and reflects the post-1994 Republican gains in state governments (i.e., a drastic escalation in elite rivalry) ignored by the electoral pressure index (Shufeldt and Flavin 2012).”

“…Districts, Incumbency Advantage, Black Politics, Southern Politics, State Legislatures, Electoral Competition Electoral competition is the standard measure for the quality of representative democracy within American states (Hogan 2003: Holbrook and Van Dunk, 1993; Shufeldt and Flavin, 2012).”