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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 62 of the 62 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Why Science Is Not Necessarily Self-Correcting

Ioannidis, John P. A. · 2012 · Perspectives on Psychological Science

Abstract

The ability to self-correct is considered a hallmark of science. However, self-correction does not always happen to scientific evidence by default. The trajectory of scientific credibility can fluctuate over time, both for defined scientific fields and for science at-large. History suggests that major catastrophes in scientific credibility are unfortunately possible and the argument that “it is obvious that progress is made” is weak. Careful evaluation of the current status of credibility of various scientific fields is important in order to understand any credibility deficits and how one could obtain and establish more trustworthy results. Efficient and unbiased replication mechanisms are essential for maintaining high levels of scientific credibility. Depending on the types of results obtained in the discovery and replication phases, there are different paradigms of research: optimal, self-correcting, false nonreplication, and perpetuated fallacy. In the absence of replication efforts, one is left with unconfirmed (genuine) discoveries and unchallenged fallacies. In several fields of investigation, including many areas of psychological science, perpetuated and unchallenged fallacies may comprise the majority of the circulating evidence. I catalogue a number of impediments to self-correction that have been empirically studied in psychological science. Finally, I discuss some proposed solutions to promote sound replication practices enhancing the credibility of scientific results as well as some potential disadvantages of each of them. Any deviation from the principle that seeking the truth has priority over any other goals may be seriously damaging to the self-correcting functions of science.

Overview

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1177/1745691612464056

Cites

62 of 62 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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Citations

Cites

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Research works printed but not linked: 1

  1. Neuliep J. W., 1993, Journal of Social Behavior and Personality, 8, 21

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Ioannidis, J. P. A.
Affiliations
Stanford Medicine (US)
Corresponding author
Ioannidis, John P. A.
Venue
Perspectives on Psychological Science
Published
2012-11
Volume
7
Issue
6
Pages
645-654
ISSN
  • 1745-6916 (ISSN-L)
  • 1745-6924
OpenAlex
W2169214811
Cited by
563
References
61
Citations by year
2026: 16 · 2025: 49 · 2024: 23 · 2023: 29 · 2022: 36 · 2021: 57 · 2020: 48 · 2019: 58 · 2018: 46 · 2017: 52 · 2016: 46 · 2015: 36 · 2014: 39 · 2013: 25 · 2012: 2
FWCI
43.79
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
journals.sagepub.com/page/policies/text-and-data-mining-license (tdm)
Locations
  • Perspectives on Psychological Science (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Psychology Research and Bibliometrics
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty › Meta-analysis and systematic reviews
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › General Psychology › Academic and Historical Perspectives in Psychology
Keywords
scientific credibility, replication, replication crisis, research paradigms, credibility deficit, scientific progress

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Why Science Is Not Necessarily Self-Correcting. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1177/1745691612464056
The paper
Ioannidis, J. P. A. (2012). Why Science Is Not Necessarily Self-Correcting. Perspectives on Psychological Science. https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691612464056

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.