The DOI matches its Crossref record; 62 of the 62 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Why Science Is Not Necessarily Self-Correcting
Abstract
The ability to self-correct is considered a hallmark of science. However, self-correction does not always happen to scientific evidence by default. The trajectory of scientific credibility can fluctuate over time, both for defined scientific fields and for science at-large. History suggests that major catastrophes in scientific credibility are unfortunately possible and the argument that “it is obvious that progress is made” is weak. Careful evaluation of the current status of credibility of various scientific fields is important in order to understand any credibility deficits and how one could obtain and establish more trustworthy results. Efficient and unbiased replication mechanisms are essential for maintaining high levels of scientific credibility. Depending on the types of results obtained in the discovery and replication phases, there are different paradigms of research: optimal, self-correcting, false nonreplication, and perpetuated fallacy. In the absence of replication efforts, one is left with unconfirmed (genuine) discoveries and unchallenged fallacies. In several fields of investigation, including many areas of psychological science, perpetuated and unchallenged fallacies may comprise the majority of the circulating evidence. I catalogue a number of impediments to self-correction that have been empirically studied in psychological science. Finally, I discuss some proposed solutions to promote sound replication practices enhancing the credibility of scientific results as well as some potential disadvantages of each of them. Any deviation from the principle that seeking the truth has priority over any other goals may be seriously damaging to the self-correcting functions of science.
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“The credibility and efficiency of the scientific ecosystem is undermined if the research community does not have access to the data that underlie scientific claims [48,49].”
From Data availability, reusability, and analytic reproducibility: evaluating the impact of a mandatory open data policy at the journal Cognition (2018) · cites this paper as [48]
In the citing paper
“Fatal errors and retractions, especially of prominent publications, are increasing [16–18].”
From The natural selection of bad science (2016) · cites this paper as [17]
In the citing paper
“In the presence of impediments, such as unclear and inconspicuous retractions, this self-correcting process may become unnecessarily slow, inefficient and ineffective [27].”
From Media and social media attention to retracted articles according to Altmetric (2021) · cites this paper as [27]
Citations
Cites
Why Most Published Research Findings Are False
Ioannidis, J. P. A. (2005) · PLoS Medicine · doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0020124 · Cited by 10,505
Self-citationThe file drawer problem and tolerance for null results.
Rosenthal, R. (1979) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.86.3.638 · Cited by 9,068 · cited 2×
“Psychology was apparently the first scientific discipline to recognize the importance of publication bias (Rosenthal, 1979) and many of the methods that have been developed to try to probe for publication bias or adjust for its presence have also been developed in the psychological literature.”
BackgroundJournal of social behavior and personality
(1986) · Personality and Individual Differences · doi:10.1016/0191-8869(86)90025-5 · Cited by 6,706
Simmons, J. P., Nelson, L. D., & Simonsohn, U. (2011) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/0956797611417632 · Cited by 6,567
Journal of The American Statistical Association
Fienberg, S. E. (2005) · Encyclopedia of Statistical Sciences · doi:10.1002/0471667196.ess1317 · Cited by 6,125
Why Most Published Research Findings Are False
Ioannidis, J. P. A. (2005) · CHANCE · doi:10.1080/09332480.2005.10722754 · Cited by 4,702 · cited 6×
“Moreover, what is not appreciated is that underpowered studies not only have low chances of detecting effects that are nonnull; they also have a lower positive predictive value for the results to be correct when they identify a statistically significant effect (Ioannidis, 2005), and they are likely to identify estimat…”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationThe Sociology of Science: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations
Kaplan, N., Merton, R. K., & Storer, N. W. (1974) · Technology and Culture · doi:10.2307/3102264 · Cited by 4,005
Raise standards for preclinical cancer research
Begley, C. G., & Ellis, L. M. (2012) · Nature · doi:10.1038/483531a · Cited by 2,979 · cited 1×
“…from diverse fields suggests that when efforts are made to repeat or reproduce published research, the repeatability and reproducibility is dismal (Begley & Ellis, 2012; Donoho, Maleki, Rahman, Shahram, & Stodden, 2009; Hothorn & Leisch, 2011; Ioannidis et al., 2009; Prinz, Schlange, & Asadullah,…”
BackgroundMeasuring the Prevalence of Questionable Research Practices With Incentives for Truth Telling
John, L. K., Loewenstein, G., & Prelec, D. (2012) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/0956797611430953 · Cited by 2,239
Fanelli, D. (2009) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0005738 · Cited by 1,911 · cited 2×
“Several empirical studies in psychological science have highlighted some of the mechanisms that lead to such selective reporting without necessarily classic file-drawer type of publication bias (Bakker & Wicherts, 2011; Fiedler, 2011; Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011) and Wagenmakers et al. (2012) make a lively pres…”
Background
Research works printed but not linked: 1
- Neuliep J. W., 1993, Journal of Social Behavior and Personality, 8, 21
Cited by
Power failure: why small sample size undermines the reliability of neuroscience
Button, K. S., Ioannidis, J. P. A., Mokrysz, C., Nosek, B. A., Flint, J., Robinson, E. S. J., & Munafò, M. R. (2013) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn3475 · Cited by 7,641
Self-citationChoosing Prediction Over Explanation in Psychology: Lessons From Machine Learning
Yarkoni, T., & Westfall, J. (2017) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/1745691617693393 · Cited by 1,916
“…and journalists alike to favor analysis procedures that produce “good” results—where a good result is one that is deemed more hypothesis-congruent, publication-worthy, soci-etally interesting, etc. (Bakker, van Dijk, & Wicherts, 2012; Dwan et al., 2008; Ferguson & Heene, 2012; Ioannidis, 2012).”
BackgroundVan Dam, N. T., van Vugt, M. K., Vago, D. R., Schmalzl, L., Saron, C. D., Olendzki, A., Meissner, T., Lazar, S. W., Kerr, C. E., Gorchov, J., et al. (2018) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/1745691617709589 · Cited by 1,506
“…and wider swaths of other basic and applied sciences, receiving considerable attention in both the scientific literature (Button et al., 2013; Ioannidis, 2005, 2012; Miguel et al., 2014; Open Science Collaboration, 2012; Pashler & Wagenmakers, 2012) and public news media (Freedman, 2010;…”
Pashler, H., & Wagenmakers, E. (2012) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/1745691612465253 · Cited by 1,321
“…mathematical modeling that any scientific field that ignores replication can easily come to the miserable state wherein (as the title of his most famous article puts it) “most published research findings are false” (see also Ioannidis, 2012, this issue, and Pashler & Harris, 2012, this issue).”
Backgroundvon Bartheld, C. S., Bahney, J., & Herculano‐Houzel, S. (2016) · Journal of Comparative Neurology · doi:10.1002/cne.24040 · Cited by 1,063
“…for the notion of a 10:1 GNR over a 50-year period is an example of a major failure in the scientific process that is supposed to self-correct invalid claims or reports (Committee on the Conduct of Science, 1989; Neville, 2007; Firestein, 2012; Ioannidis, 2012), as explained in more detail below.”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Ioannidis, J. P. A.
- Affiliations
- Stanford Medicine (US)
- Corresponding author
- Ioannidis, John P. A.
- Venue
- Perspectives on Psychological Science
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2012-11
- Volume
- 7
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 645-654
- ISSN
- 1745-6916 (ISSN-L)
- 1745-6924
- OpenAlex
- W2169214811
- Cited by
- 563
- References
- 61
- Citations by year
- 2026: 16 · 2025: 49 · 2024: 23 · 2023: 29 · 2022: 36 · 2021: 57 · 2020: 48 · 2019: 58 · 2018: 46 · 2017: 52 · 2016: 46 · 2015: 36 · 2014: 39 · 2013: 25 · 2012: 2
- FWCI
- 43.79
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- journals.sagepub.com/page/policies/text-and-data-mining-license (tdm)
- Locations
- Perspectives on Psychological Science (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Psychology Research and Bibliometrics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty › Meta-analysis and systematic reviews
- Social Sciences › Psychology › General Psychology › Academic and Historical Perspectives in Psychology
- Keywords
- scientific credibility, replication, replication crisis, research paradigms, credibility deficit, scientific progress
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- Ioannidis, J. P. A. (2012). Why Science Is Not Necessarily Self-Correcting. Perspectives on Psychological Science. https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691612464056
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.