Lessons From Pinocchio: Cues to Deception May Be Highly Exaggerated
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 51 of the 51 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Deception researchers widely acknowledge that cues to deception—observable behaviors that may differ between truthful and deceptive messages—tend to be weak. Nevertheless, several deception cues have been reported with unusually large effect sizes, and some researchers have advocated the use of such cues as tools for detecting deceit and assessing credibility in practical contexts. By examining data from empirical deception-cue research and using a series of Monte Carlo simulations, I demonstrate that many estimated effect sizes of deception cues may be greatly inflated by publication bias, small numbers of estimates, and low power. Indeed, simulations indicate the informational value of the present deception literature is quite low, such that it is not possible to determine whether any given effect is real or a false positive. I warn against the hazards of relying on potentially illusory cues to deception and offer some recommendations for improving the state of the science of deception.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Why Most Published Research Findings Are False
Ioannidis, J. P. A. (2005) · PLoS Medicine · doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0020124 · Cited by 10,505
The case for motivated reasoning.
Kunda, Z. (1990) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.108.3.480 · Cited by 9,022
Estimating the reproducibility of psychological science
Open Science Collaboration (2015) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.aac4716 · Cited by 8,515
Power failure: why small sample size undermines the reliability of neuroscience
Button, K. S., Ioannidis, J. P. A., Mokrysz, C., Nosek, B. A., Flint, J., Robinson, E. S. J., & Munafò, M. R. (2013) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn3475 · Cited by 7,641
Simmons, J. P., Nelson, L. D., & Simonsohn, U. (2011) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/0956797611417632 · Cited by 6,567
Why Most Published Research Findings Are False
Ioannidis, J. P. A. (2005) · CHANCE · doi:10.1080/09332480.2005.10722754 · Cited by 4,702
Cohen, J. (1994) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/0003-066x.49.12.997 · Cited by 4,003
Belief in the law of small numbers.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1971) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/h0031322 · Cited by 3,246
Statistical tests, P values, confidence intervals, and power: a guide to misinterpretations
Greenland, S., Senn, S. J., Rothman, K. J., Carlin, J. B., Poole, C., Goodman, S. N., & Altman, D. G. (2016) · European Journal of Epidemiology · doi:10.1007/s10654-016-0149-3 · Cited by 3,200
The New Statistics: Why and How
Cumming, G. (2014) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/0956797613504966 · Cited by 3,200
Metadata
- Authors
- Luke, T. J.
- Venue
- Perspectives on Psychological Science
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2019-06-07
- Volume
- 14
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 646-671
- ISSN
- 1745-6916 (ISSN-L)
- 1745-6924
- OpenAlex
- W2944899167
- Cited by
- 159
- References
- 51
- FWCI
- 23.58
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Lessons From Pinocchio: Cues to Deception May Be Highly Exaggerated. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1177/1745691619838258
- The paper
- Luke, T. J. (2019). Lessons From Pinocchio: Cues to Deception May Be Highly Exaggerated. Perspectives on Psychological Science. https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691619838258
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.