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Physicians, Information Technology, and Health Care Systems: A Journey, Not a Destination

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McDonald, C. J. · 2003 · Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association
Cited by 54

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

Two papers in this issue of JAMIA discuss computerized physician order entry (CPOE) and a third one discusses patient clinical information systems (PCISs), which often include CPOE. The first paper, by Ash and colleagues, simply reports the rate at which U.S. hospitals and their care providers are adopting physician order entry systems.1 The other two challenge the current push toward rapid adoption of CPOE and PCIS in the health care industry—Berger and Kichak,2 by challenging the evidence base for the push, and Ash et al.,3 by calling attention to many failure points that occur when rigid computer system designs meet the reality of really complex clinical systems. Before commenting on these papers, we should confess our long-term infatuation with computers and a 30-year conviction that computers could be the “chicken soup” for many illnesses of the health care system. We proved that computer reminders systems are chicken soup for preventive care in a series of studies starting in 1976.4–7 Then, during the early 1980s, we spent our nights and weekends and as much time as we could scrape from our workday writing, testing, implementing, and studying software for what would become the Medical Gopher,8 the first PC-based order entry system used, and studied, in outpatient care.9–11 More years were required to tune and adapt this system, born in an outpatient setting, for an inpatient service. Then we performed the first, and what may be the only, randomized trial of CPOE in the hospital and proved that our Medical Gopher order entry system is chicken soup to hospital inefficiency. It reduced the cost of care and improved the workflow among CPOE users by 13% compared with the control group who used the traditional paper orders. An example of its benefit to work flow improvement is the 12-fold reduction in the delay from writing admission orders to the execution of those orders: from an average of six hours to 30 minutes. And physicians liked it. Because the hospital liked it too, we then extended it to include all hospital services. This hospital (perhaps coincidentally) now has the lowest mortality rate and the third lowest costs of all hospitals in the University Hospital Consortium (UHC).11 While on the subject of this controlled trial of the Medical Gopher,12 we have to quibble with Berger and Kichak's statement that it included only one internal medicine service. In fact, it included all six internal medicine services at the hospital, half of which used the computer order entry system and half of which did not. As we published papers on this system in the late 1980s and 1990s, some reviewers criticized the work as being irrelevant because no one else used or ever would use CPOE. So it tickles us to read that as many as 13% of U.S. hospitals now have CPOE.3 The principal argument for the push to adopt CPOE has been the promise of lifesaving benefits. While we believe CPOE has great potential to improve the health care process, we have to agree with Berger and Kichak's position that a convincing case for lifesaving benefits has not been made. As Berger and Kichak point out, the keystone for these arguments—namely, the Institute of Medicine's (IOM's) claim of 44,000 to 98,000 deaths due to medical errors—crumbles on close inspection. The 98,000 figure was extrapolated from the 173 deaths (13.6%) among selected New York patients who were hospitalized in 1984 and had an adverse event. The extrapolation assumes that none of these fairly sick hospitalized patients would have died in the absence of the adverse event, and ignores the fact that the patients with adverse events had a death rate no different than the death rate (13.8%) of the target population from which they were drawn.13 Any arbitrary criteria—such as being assigned a hospital number ending in the digit 3—used to select patients from the same target population would have led to the same high death rate. Leape has suggested that one reason why airplanes are safer than hospitals is that the pilot goes down with the plane.14 What he apparently fails to realize is that (1) hospitals are substantially more complex than airplanes (with more people and moving parts and systems that need to integrate), and (2), for a large number of disastrously ill patients, the plane is already on its way down when the physician-pilot climbs on board. Errors happen more often in the most complex situations, where mortality risk is highest to begin with. Berger and Kichak also remind us that new technology is never completely virtuous. CPOE eliminates illegible orders and provides opportunities for better ordering, but computer systems also introduce errors of their own. As we were writing this editorial, the United States Pharmacopeia (USP) published a report to reinforce this point. Based on one year's worth of reports from 480 U.S. hospitals, the USP found that 8.2% of potentially harmful medication ordering errors arise from computer order entry errors.15 (The majority

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Metadata

Authors
McDonald, C. J.
Venue
Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association
Published
2003-11-21
Volume
11
Issue
2
Pages
121-124
ISSN
  • 1067-5027 (ISSN-L)
  • 1527-974X
OpenAlex
W1857115653
Cited by
54
References
6
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
bronze

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