Bayesians, Frequentists, and Scientists
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Broadly speaking, nineteenth century statistics was Bayesian, while the twentieth century was frequentist, at least from the point of view of most scientific practitioners. Here in the twenty-first century scientists are bringing statisticians much bigger problems to solve, often comprising millions of data points and thousands of parameters. Which statistical philosophy will dominate practice? My guess, backed up with some recent examples, is that a combination of Bayesian and frequentist ideas will be needed to deal with our increasingly intense scientific environment. This will be a challenging period for statisticians, both applied and theoretical, but it also opens the opportunity for a new golden age, rivaling that of Fisher, Neyman, and the other giants of the early 1900s. What follows is the text of the 164th ASA presidential address, delivered at the awards ceremony in Toronto on August 10, 2004.
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Depending on the parametrisation of the model, it can be difficult to obtain a flat metric and hence to specify an uninformative prior.
“Depending on the parametrisation of the model it can in practice be difficult to obtain a flat metric and hence to specify an uninformative prior [27].”
From Joining forces of Bayesian and frequentist methodology: a study for inference in the presence of non-identifiability (2013) · cites this paper as [27]
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References 7 · Cited by 201
- Authors
- Efron, B.
- Affiliations
- Stanford University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Efron, Bradley
- Venue
- Journal of the American Statistical Association
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2005-03
- Volume
- 100
- Issue
- 469
- Pages
- 1-5
- ISSN
- 0162-1459 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-274X
- OpenAlex
- W2094779818
- Cited by
- 201
- References
- 7
- Citations by year
- 2026: 3 · 2025: 5 · 2024: 10 · 2023: 8 · 2022: 6 · 2021: 8 · 2020: 9 · 2019: 8 · 2018: 9 · 2017: 8 · 2016: 13 · 2015: 17 · 2014: 9 · 2013: 12 · 2012: 15
- FWCI
- 11.08
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
- doi.org
- Locations
- Journal of the American Statistical Association (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Mathematics › Statistics and Probability › Statistical Methods and Bayesian Inference
- Physical Sciences › Mathematics › Statistics and Probability › Probability and Statistical Research
- Physical Sciences › Mathematics › Statistics and Probability › Statistical Methods and Applications
- Keywords
- Bayesian analysis, frequentist statistics, history of statistics, high-dimensional data, big data, scientific data analysis, fishermen
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