The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions
Open accessAbstract
When it comes to epistemic normativity, should we take the good to be prior to the right? That is, should we ground facts about what we ought and ought not believe on a given occasion in facts about the value of being in certain cognitive states (such as, for example, the value of having true beliefs)? The overwhelming answer among contemporary epistemologists is “Yes, we should.” This essay argues to the contrary. Just as taking the good to be prior to the right in ethics often leads one to sanction implausible trade-offs when determining what an agent should do, so too, this essay argues, taking the good to be prior to the right in epistemology leads one to sanction implausible trade-offs when determining what a subject should believe. Epistemic value—and, by extension, epistemic goals—are not the explanatory foundation upon which all other normative notions in epistemology rest.
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Cites
Plantinga, A. (1993) · doi:10.1093/0195078640.001.0001 · Cited by 1,703
Wedgwood, R. (2002) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/1468-0068.36.s16.10 · Cited by 279
Metadata
- Authors
- Berker, S.
- Venue
- The Philosophical Review
- Publisher
- Duke University Press
- Published
- 2013-07-01
- Volume
- 122
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 337-393
- ISSN
- 0031-8108 (ISSN-L)
- 1558-1470
- OpenAlex
- W2018296704
- Cited by
- 336
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 87.56
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
