Who Is the Subject of the Rights of Man?

Political subjects are only truly political for Rancière insofar as they are 'surplus subjects.'

“'Political subjects,' therefore, are only truly political for Rancière insofar as they are 'surplus subjects.'”

Rancière conceives politics as scenes of dissensus in which subjects officially deemed not to exist enact a supplement to the official count of the dominant order.

“Rancière conceives of politics as the content of 'specific scenes of dissensus' in which subjects who are officially deemed to not exist, paradoxically, nonetheless enact a 'supplement' to the official 'count' of the dominant order (2004, p. 305).”

For Rancière, human rights are activated as the besieged rights of political subjects whose nonexistence within the dominant order verifies the contentious polemic they initiate.

“Human rights are activated, for Rancière, as the besieged rights of those political subjects whose very nonexistence within the dominant order verifies the contentious polemic that they initiate.”

Rancière asserts that the Rights of Man are the rights of political subjects of no-count who do not exist until they activate dissensus and unsettle the order of police.

“He goes on to assert that the Rights of Man (or 'human rights,' so to speak) are indeed nothing less than the rights of these political subjects, those of no-count, who do not exist until they activate this dissensus and unsettle the order of the police.”