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Pareto-Improving Campaign Finance Policy
Abstract
This paper argues that campaign finance policy, in the form of contribution limits and matching public financing, can be Pareto improving even under very optimistic assumptions concerning the role of campaign advertising and the rationality of voters. The optimistic assumptions are that candidates use campaign contributions to convey truthful information to voters about their qualifications for office and that voters update their beliefs rationally on the basis of the information they have seen.The argument also assumes that campaign contributions are provided by interest groups and that candidates can offer to provide policy favors to attract higher contributions.
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Citations
Cited by
Political connections and preferential access to finance: The role of campaign contributions
Claessens, S., Feijen, E., & Laeven, L. (2008) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.11.003 · Cited by 1,724
Ideology and Interests in the Political Marketplace
Bonica, A. (2013) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12014 · Cited by 381
Besley, T. (2005) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/089533005774357761 · Cited by 371
Some talk: Money in politics. A (partial) review of the literature
Stratmann, T. (2005) · Policy Challenges and Political Responses · doi:10.1007/0-387-28038-3_8 · Cited by 283
Bonica, A. (2016) · Business and Politics · doi:10.1515/bap-2016-0004 · Cited by 147
Metadata
- Authors
- Coate, S.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2004-05-01
- Volume
- 94
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 628-655
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2034021144
- Cited by
- 233
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 85.80
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.