The DOI matches its Crossref record; 11 of the 11 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
International Protection of Intellectual Property
Abstract
We study the incentives that governments have to protect intellectual property in a trading world economy. We consider a world economy with ongoing innovation in two countries that differ in market size and in their capacity for innovation. After describing the determination of national patent policies in a noncooperative regime of patent protection, we ask, “Why is intellectual property better protected in the North than in the South?” We also study international patent agreements by deriving the properties of an efficient global regime of patent protection and asking whether harmonization of patent policies is necessary or sufficient for global efficiency.
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Citations
Cites
Determinants of patent rights: A cross-national study
Ginarte, J. C., & Park, W. G. (1997) · Research Policy · doi:10.1016/s0048-7333(97)00022-x · Cited by 1,345
Innovation, Imitation, and Intellectual Property Rights
Helpman, E. (1993) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2951642 · Cited by 1,068
Intellectual Property Rights in the Global Economy
Maskus, K. E. (2000) · Cited by 659
Invention, Growth and Welfare: A Theoretical Treatment of Technological Change.
Whitaker, J., & Nordhaus, W. D. (1970) · Economica · doi:10.2307/2551965 · Cited by 632
Chaudhuri, S., Goldberg, P. K., & Jia, P. (2006) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.96.5.1477 · Cited by 287
Reaping what you sow: an empirical analysis of international patent harmonization
McCalman, P. (2001) · Journal of International Economics · doi:10.1016/s0022-1996(01)00091-5 · Cited by 254
The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Treaties
Scotchmer, S. (2004) · Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/ewh040 · Cited by 181
The North’s intellectual property rights standard for the South?
Lai, E. L.-C., & Qiu, L. D. (2003) · Journal of International Economics · doi:10.1016/s0022-1996(02)00090-9 · Cited by 173
Self-citationEconomic Growth with Imperfect Protection of Intellectual Property Rights
Horii, R., & Iwaisako, T. (2006) · Journal of Economics · doi:10.1007/s00712-006-0222-6 · Cited by 147
Lai, E. L. ‐., Riezman, R., & Wang, P. (2008) · Economic Theory · doi:10.1007/s00199-007-0326-4 · Cited by 141
Self-citation
Cited by
International patent protection: 1960–2005
Park, W. G. (2008) · Research Policy · doi:10.1016/j.respol.2008.01.006 · Cited by 821
The Political Economy of the World Trading System: The WTO and Beyond
Hoekman, B. M., & Kostecki, M. M. (2009) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780199553761.001.0001 · Cited by 627
Patents and Innovation: Evidence from Economic History
Moser, P. (2013) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.27.1.23 · Cited by 452
An empirical investigation of the pollution haven effect with strategic environment and trade policy
Kellenberg, D. K. (2009) · Journal of International Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jinteco.2009.04.004 · Cited by 434
Kim, Y. K., Lee, K., Park, W. G., & Choo, K. (2012) · Research Policy · doi:10.1016/j.respol.2011.09.003 · Cited by 406
Metadata
- Authors
- Grossman, G. M., & Lai, E. L.-C.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2004-12-01
- Volume
- 94
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1635-1653
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3123358398
- Cited by
- 546
- References
- 11
- FWCI
- 39.71
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.