The DOI matches its Crossref record; 14 of the 14 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Unnatural Selection: Perverse Incentives and the Misallocation of Credit in Japan
Abstract
We examine the misallocation of credit in Japan associated with the perverse incentives faced by banks to provide additional credit to the weakest firms. Firms are more likely to receive additional bank credit if they are in poor financial condition, because troubled Japanese banks have an incentive to allocate credit to severely impaired borrowers in order to avoid the realization of losses on their own balance sheets. This “evergreening” behavior is more prevalent among banks that have reported capital ratios close to the required minimum, and is compounded by the incentives arising from extensive corporate affiliations.
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Cites
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“In fact, it is in the self-interest of banks to follow a policy of forbearance with their problem borrowers in order to avoid pressure on the banks to increase their own loan loss reserves, further impairing their capital.”
Collateral Damage: Effects of the Japanese Bank Crisis on Real Activity in the United States
Peek, J., & Rosengren, E. S. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.1.30 · Cited by 1,186
Self-citationAppointments of outsiders to Japanese boards: Determinants and implications for managers
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Firm performance, corporate governance, and top executive turnover in Japan
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Banks and corporate control in Japan
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Do Banking Shocks Affect Borrowing Firm Performance? An Analysis of the Japanese Experience
Kang, J.-K., & Stulz, R. M. (1998) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.136708 · Cited by 392 · cited 2×
“Bank regulation and supervision policies in Japan provide banks that have significant nonperforming loans and impaired capital little incentive to be strict with troubled borrowers.”
Do Banking Shocks Affect Borrowing Firm Performance? An Analysis of the Japanese Experience
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Troubled Banks, Impaired Foreign Direct Investment: The Role of Relative Access to Credit
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Self-citationDeterminants of the Japan premium: actions speak louder than words
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Cited by
Policy distortions and aggregate productivity with heterogeneous establishments
Restuccia, D., & Rogerson, R. (2008) · Review of Economic Dynamics · doi:10.1016/j.red.2008.05.002 · Cited by 1,613
Zombie Lending and Depressed Restructuring in Japan
Caballero, R. J., Hoshi, T., & Kashyap, A. K. (2008) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.98.5.1943 · Cited by 1,543
The financial cycle and macroeconomics: What have we learnt?
Borio, C. (2014) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2013.07.031 · Cited by 1,130
Amiti, M., & Weinstein, D. E. (2011) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjr033 · Cited by 951
Whatever It Takes: The Real Effects of Unconventional Monetary Policy
Acharya, V. V., Eisert, T., Eufinger, C., & Hirsch, C. (2019) · The Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhz005 · Cited by 704
Metadata
- Authors
- Peek, J., & Rosengren, E. S.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2005-08-01
- Volume
- 95
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1144-1166
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3121930358
- Cited by
- 822
- References
- 14
- FWCI
- 38.62
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.