Cited by 2,161Financial Markets and Investment StrategiesStock Market Forecasting MethodsEconomic theories and models

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 78 of the 78 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; none of the 51 sources its claims cite is checked for support yet.

The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Its Critics

Malkiel, Burton G·2003·Journal of Economic Perspectives

Abstract

Revolutions often spawn counterrevolutions and the efficient market hypothesis in finance is no exception. The intellectual dominance of the efficient-market revolution has more been challenged by economists who stress psychological and behavorial elements of stock-price determination and by econometricians who argue that stock returns are, to a considerable extent, predictable. This survey examines the attacks on the efficient market hypothesis and the relationship between predictability and efficiency. I conclude that our stock markets are more efficient and less predictable than many recent academic papers would have us believe.

Overview

AI snapshot

Written from the paper’s full text.

TL;DR

Malkiel surveys challenges to the efficient market hypothesis from behavioral finance and predictability research and argues that stock markets remain far more efficient and far less predictable than critics claim. He concludes that documented anomalies are generally not robust or exploitable after transactions costs and that professional investors rarely beat broad index funds.

Key findings

  • Predictability claims exist but are weak or unreliable: Fama and French (1988) found 25–40% of the variation in long holding-period returns can be predicted from negative correlation with past returns, and dividend yields or P/E ratios can explain as much as 40% of future return variance. Yet Malkiel notes these predictors failed after the mid-1980s: with S&P 500 P/E in the low 20s and dividend yield below 3% in June 1987, the next 10-year annual total return was 16.7%; after June 1992, with yield at 3% and P/E in the mid-twenties, the subsequent return through June 2002 was 11.4%; from December 1996, despite Campbell and Shiller’s near-zero forecast, the S&P 500 returned almost 7% annually through mid-2002.
  • Anomalies are not dependable or profitable: small-company stocks returned over one percentage point more than large stocks since 1926, but there was no gain from holding smaller stocks from the mid-1980s through the 1990s; a Dimensional Fund Advisors value fund had an abnormal return of negative 0.2% per month over 1993–1998; momentum investors did worse than buy-and-hold investors because of transactions costs; and the January effect became undependable after publicity.
  • Professional managers generally underperform: about three-quarters of actively managed funds failed to beat the S&P 500 and Wilshire indexes over the past decade; the median large-cap equity fund underperformed the S&P 500 by almost two percentage points over 10-, 15-, and 20-year periods; of 355 original funds over 30 years, only five outperformed the market by two percentage points per year or more; top funds of 1998–1999 did three times the index then three times worse in 2000–2001.
  • Historical bubbles and crashes do not necessarily prove exploitable inefficiency: the October 1987 one-third drop coincided with long-term Treasury yields rising from about 9% to almost 10.5% and higher risk perceptions; a discount-rate rise from 11% to 13% would lower an index from $100 to $66.67. The Internet bubble offered no obvious arbitrage opportunity before it popped, and the Palm/3Com mispricing could not be shorted because too little Palm stock was outstanding. The historical equity risk premium—stocks about 10.5% versus high-grade bonds about 5.5% from 1926–2001—is partly attributed to survivorship bias and unexpected capital gains.

Methods

  • Design: a survey/essay synthesizing theoretical and empirical literature on the efficient market hypothesis, behavioral finance, predictability, anomalies, and historical episodes; it is not a new primary empirical study or formal meta-analysis.
  • Data/sample: cited studies and exhibits, including U.S. stock returns since 1926, S&P 500 dividend-yield and P/E deciles through 2000/2002, Fama–French size/value data for 1963–1990, mutual fund performance data through mid-2002, and examples such as the 1987 crash, the Internet bubble, and Palm/3Com.
  • Analysis: narrative evaluation of statistical versus economic significance, robustness across sample periods, transaction costs, risk proxies, and limits to arbitrage; includes a simple present-value/discount-rate example for the 1987 crash.

Limitations

  • The paper states it makes no attempt to present a complete survey; it acknowledges that markets can make egregious valuation errors (e.g., the Internet bubble), that psychological factors influence securities prices, and that behavioral influences cannot be ruled out.
  • The paper notes survivorship bias in mutual fund datasets and data-mining/publication bias in the anomaly literature; predictable patterns may be time-dependent and can disappear after publication.
  • Evident from the text: as an interpretive survey by an EMH proponent, it relies on selected cited findings and exhibits rather than new systematic tests, and its conclusions about non-exploitability depend on assumptions about transaction costs and risk adjustment.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1257/089533003321164958

Cites

78 of 78 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

72 Own interpretation · 52 Not checked yet · 30 No basis given · 9 Own result

Verify all 51 references — free account

Show all 103 claims

  • It may state two separate claims as one. 31
  • Probably not a substantial claim. 31
60 of 60
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Interest rates tend to be mean reverting.

    “the tendency of interest rates to be mean reverting”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Yields on long-term Treasury bonds increased from about 9 percent to almost 10 ½ percent in the two months prior to mid-October 1987.

    “yields on long-term Treasury bonds increased from about 9 percent to almost 10 ½ percent in the two months prior to mid-October.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Congress threatened to impose a 'merger tax' that would have made merger activity prohibitively expensive and could well have ended the merger boom.

    “Early in the month, Congress threatened to impose a 'merger tax' that would have made merger activity prohibitively expensive and could well have ended the merger boom.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    James Baker threatened to encourage a further fall in the exchange value of the dollar, increasing risks for foreign investors and frightening domestic investors.

    “Also, in early October 1987, then Secretary of the Treasury James Baker had threatened to encourage a further fall in the exchange value of the dollar, increasing risks for foreign investors and frightening domestic investors as well.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Stocks are priced as the present value of the expected future stream of dividends.

    “Suppose stocks are priced as the present value of the expected future stream of dividends.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Professional fund managers are compensated with strong incentives to outperform the market.

    “who often are compensated with strong incentives to outperform the market”
6 of 6

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.

2 of 2

Citations

Cites

Show all 69 references

Research works printed but not linked: 4

  1. Fama Eugene, 1993, Journal of Finance., 33, 3
  2. 1980, American Economic Review., 70, 393
  3. Malkiel Burton G, 2000, Wall Street Journal
  4. Samuelson Paul, 1965, Industrial Management Review, 6, 41

Cited by

Sorted by citations

See all 2,161

Metadata

Authors
Malkiel, B. G.
Affiliations
Princeton University (US)
Corresponding author
Malkiel, Burton G
Venue
Journal of Economic Perspectives
Published
2003-02-01
Volume
17
Issue
1
Pages
59-82
ISSN
0895-3309 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2138293190
Cited by
2,161
References
69
Citations by year
2026: 82 · 2025: 154 · 2024: 105 · 2023: 143 · 2022: 125 · 2021: 142 · 2020: 132 · 2019: 108 · 2018: 112 · 2017: 111 · 2016: 89 · 2015: 151 · 2014: 120 · 2013: 113 · 2012: 115
FWCI
40.69
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • The Journal of Economic Perspectives (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Financial Markets and Investment Strategies
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Stock Market Forecasting Methods
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic theories and models
Keywords
efficient market hypothesis, stock price predictability, behavioral finance, market efficiency, stock returns

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

A language model drew the claims from the paper on 2026-10-10, under version 3 of the claim definition (model deepseek-v4.1-flash, prompt extract-v3).

A second model labelled each claim on 2026-10-10 (model jev-1.13-20260917, definition revision gold-guideline-v0.2).

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review