The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments
Abstract
We show that political institutions affect corruption levels. We use audit reports in Brazil to construct new measures of political corruption in local governments and test whether electoral accountability affects the corruption practices of incumbent politicians. We find significantly less corruption in municipalities where mayors can get reelected. Mayors with reelection incentives misappropriate 27 percent fewer resources than mayors without reelection incentives. These effects are more pronounced among municipalities with less access to information and where the likelihood of judicial punishment is lower. Overall our findings suggest that electoral rules that enhance political accountability play a crucial role in constraining politician's corrupt behavior. (JEL D72, K42, O17)
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Active and Passive Waste in Government Spending: Evidence from a Policy Experiment
Bandiera, O., Prat, A., & Valletti, T. (2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.4.1278 · Cited by 534
Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
(2011) · The Encyclopedia of Political Science · doi:10.4135/9781608712434.n14 · Cited by 9
Cited by
Unobservable Selection and Coefficient Stability: Theory and Evidence
Oster, E. (2019) · Journal of Business & Economic Statistics · doi:10.1080/07350015.2016.1227711 · Cited by 5,367
Retrospective Voting Reconsidered
Healy, A., & Malhotra, N. (2013) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-032211-212920 · Cited by 667
POLITICIANS AT WORK: THE PRIVATE RETURNS AND SOCIAL COSTS OF POLITICAL CONNECTIONS
Cingano, F., & Pinotti, P. (2013) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1111/jeea.12001 · Cited by 561
Do Oil Windfalls Improve Living Standards? Evidence from Brazil
Caselli, F., & Michaels, G. (2013) · American Economic Journal: Applied Economics · doi:10.1257/app.5.1.208 · Cited by 554
Active and Passive Waste in Government Spending: Evidence from a Policy Experiment
Bandiera, O., Prat, A., & Valletti, T. (2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.4.1278 · Cited by 534
Metadata
- Authors
- Ferraz, C., & Finan, F.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2011-06-01
- Volume
- 101
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1274-1311
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1990889500
- Cited by
- 975
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 137.16
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1257/aer.101.4.1274
- The paper
- Ferraz, C., & Finan, F. (2011). Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments. American Economic Review. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.4.1274
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
