Targeting the Poor: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia
Open accessAbstract
This paper reports an experiment in 640 Indonesian villages on three approaches to target the poor: proxy means tests (PMT), where assets are used to predict consumption; community targeting, where villagers rank everyone from richest to poorest; and a hybrid. Defining poverty based on PPP$2 per capita consumption, community targeting and the hybrid perform somewhat worse in identifying the poor than PMT, though not by enough to significantly affect poverty outcomes for a typical program. Elite capture does not explain these results. Instead, communities appear to apply a different concept of poverty. Consistent with this finding, community targeting results in higher satisfaction. (JEL C93, I32, I38, O12, O15, O18, R23)
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The simulations in the paper are broadly similar to other analyses of targeting performance.
“The simulations described in this section (particularly Figures 4 and 5) are broadly similar to other analyses of targeting performance, such as Ravallion (2009), Alatas, Banerjee, Hanna, Olken, and Tobias (2012), and particularly Klasen and Lange (2016).”
From Universal Basic Incomes versus Targeted Transfers: Anti-Poverty Programs in Developing Countries (2018) · cites this paper as Alatas, Banerjee, Hanna, Olken, and Tobias (2012)
Communities appear to target based on earning potential rather than actual earnings.
“In Alatas et al. (2012), we showed that communities appear to target based on earning potential, rather than actual earnings.”
From Universal Basic Incomes versus Targeted Transfers: Anti-Poverty Programs in Developing Countries (2018) · cites this paper as Alatas et al. (2012)
There was no detectable elite capture in the community-based targeting experiment.
“Furthermore, there was no detectable elite capture (Alatas, Banerjee, Hanna, Olken, and Tobias 2012).”
From Universal Basic Incomes versus Targeted Transfers: Anti-Poverty Programs in Developing Countries (2018) · cites this paper as Alatas, Banerjee, Hanna, Olken, and Tobias 2012
In an experimental comparison in Indonesia, citizens vastly preferred community-based targeting to a data-based proxy-means test.
“we found that citizens vastly preferred the community based-approach to a data-based proxy-means test.”
From Universal Basic Incomes versus Targeted Transfers: Anti-Poverty Programs in Developing Countries (2018) · cites this paper as Alatas, Banerjee, Hanna, Olken, and Tobias 2012
The actual empirical evidence on ordeal mechanisms as an efficient form of targeting is mixed.
“The actual empirical evidence on ordeal mechanisms as an efficient form of targeting is mixed (Alatas et al. 2012, 1206; Shafir 2012).”
From Human Capital and Administrative Burden: The Role of Cognitive Resources in Citizen‐State Interactions (2020) · cites this paper as Alatas et al. 2012, 1206
The Conclusion (IX; page unavailable) mentions an ordeal mechanism only as a possible approach for future research. A search for empirical evidence on ordeal mechanisms and their cost-effectiveness found no passage assessing whether that evidence is mixed; the paper’s reported comparisons concern other targeting methods. (LLM, conf=0.76)
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Research works printed but not linked: 14
- Alderman Harold Do Local Officials Know Something We Don't? Decentralization of Targeted Transfers in Albania. Journal of Public Economics 2002 83 2 375 404
- Bardhan Pranab Mookherjee Dilip Decentralizing Antipoverty Program Delivery in Developing Countries. Journal of Public Economics 2005 89 4 675 704
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- Daly Anne Fane George Anti-Poverty Programs in Indonesia. Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 2002 38 3 309 239
- Dearden Lorraine Ravallion Martin Social Security in a “Moral Economy” An Empirical Analysis for Java The Review of Economics and Statistics 1988 70 1 36 44
- Deaton Angus S. The Analysis of Household Surveys: A Microeconomic Approach to Development Policy 1997 Johns Hopkins University Press Baltimore
- Galasso Emanuela Ravallion Martin Decentralized Targeting of an Antipoverty Program. Journal of Public Economics 2005 89 4 705 727
- Knuth Donald The Art of Computer Programming Sorting and Searching 1998 3 80 105 Addison-Wesley Second Edition
- Nichols Albert L. Zeckhauser Richard J. Targeting Transfers through Restrictions on Recipients. American Economic Review 1982 72 2 372 77
- Olken Benjamin A. Corruption and the Costs of Redistribution: Micro Evidence From Indonesia Journal of Public Economics 2006 90 4-5 853 870
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- Ravallion Martin Miss-targeted or miss-measured? Economics Letters 2008 100 1 9 12
- Seabright Paul Accountability and Decentralization in Government: An Incomplete Contracts Model. European Economic Review 1996 40 61 89
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Christensen, J., Aarøe, L., Baekgaard, M., Herd, P., & Moynihan, D. P. (2020) · Public Administration Review · doi:10.1111/puar.13134 · Cited by 458 · see citing works
“The actual empirical evidence on ordeal mechanisms as an efficient form of targeting is mixed (Alatas et al. 2012, 1206; Shafir 2012).”
BackgroundUniversal Basic Incomes versus Targeted Transfers: Anti-Poverty Programs in Developing Countries
Hanna, R., & Olken, B. A. (2018) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.32.4.201 · Cited by 299 · see citing works
Self-citationMuralidharan, K., & Niehaus, P. (2017) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.31.4.103 · Cited by 194 · see citing works
- Authors
- Alatas, V., Banerjee, A., Hanna, R., Olken, B. A., & Tobias, J.
- Affiliations
- World Bank (US)
- Massachusetts Institute of Technology (US)
- Harvard University (US)
- Stanford University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Tobias, Julia
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2012-06-01
- Volume
- 102
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1206-1240
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- PMC
- PMC4156293
- OpenAlex
- W2084984189
- Cited by
- 536
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 40 · 2025: 40 · 2024: 32 · 2023: 26 · 2022: 51 · 2021: 42 · 2020: 52 · 2019: 40 · 2018: 35 · 2017: 38 · 2016: 30 · 2015: 28 · 2014: 26 · 2013: 28 · 2012: 14
- FWCI
- 84.14
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
- Locations
- American Economic Review (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (acceptedVersion)
- PubMed Central (acceptedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Harvard Dataverse (submittedVersion, public-domain)
- DSpace@MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc)
- Funders
- Eunice Kennedy Shriver National Institute of Child Health and Human Development (P01HD061315)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Safety Research › Poverty, Education, and Child Welfare
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Income, Poverty, and Inequality
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Microfinance and Financial Inclusion
- Keywords
- targeting of the poor, poverty targeting, proxy means test, consumption-based poverty, elite capture, beneficiary satisfaction
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