CoChat
Sign Up
Cited by 707Decision-Making and Behavioral EconomicsHealthcare Policy and ManagementFinancial Literacy, Pension, Retirement Analysis

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 61 of the 61 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Adverse Selection and Inertia in Health Insurance Markets: When Nudging Hurts

Open access
Handel, Benjamin R·2013·American Economic Review
DOI 10.1257/aer.103.7.2643
Open this paper in CoChat — free accountOpen PDF

Abstract

This paper investigates consumer inertia in health insurance markets, where adverse selection is a potential concern. We leverage a major change to insurance provision that occurred at a large firm to identify substantial inertia, and develop and estimate a choice model that also quantifies risk preferences and ex ante health risk. We use these estimates to study the impact of policies that nudge consumers toward better decisions by reducing inertia. When aggregated, these improved individual-level choices substantially exacerbate adverse selection in our setting, leading to an overall reduction in welfare that doubles the existing welfare loss from adverse selection. (JEL D82, G22, I13)

Overview

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1257/aer.103.7.2643

Cites

61 of 61 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Recomputing p-values needs the paper’s full text.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The text we found for this paper looks like another document, so its claims and self-check weren’t run. The registry and citation checks still apply.

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The text we found for this paper looks like another document, so the self-check wasn’t run.

Citations

Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

Show all 61 references

Research works printed but not linked: 1

  1. Handel Benjamin R, 2013, American Economic Review. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer., 103, 2643, 10.1257/aer.103.7.2643 · DOI

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Items 701–707 of 707

Related

See all

Metadata

Authors
Handel, B. R.
Affiliations
University of California, Berkeley (US)
Corresponding author
Handel, Benjamin R
Venue
American Economic Review
Publisher
American Economic Association
Published
2013-12-01
Volume
103
Issue
7
Pages
2643-2682
ISSN
0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1257/aer.103.7.2643
OpenAlex
W1994153666
Semantic Scholar
a3e7ff4d383529b4c8228a3ab62636acefbc2669
Cited by
707
References
61
Citations by year
2026: 29 · 2025: 47 · 2024: 40 · 2023: 70 · 2022: 49 · 2021: 71 · 2020: 45 · 2019: 63 · 2018: 63 · 2017: 73 · 2016: 44 · 2015: 67 · 2014: 24 · 2013: 15
FWCI
36.13
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • American Economic Review (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Healthcare Policy and Management
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Financial Literacy, Pension, Retirement Analysis
Keywords
adverse selection, consumer inertia, health insurance market, nudging, risk preferences, welfare loss, employer-sponsored health insurance, choice models
MeSH terms
Consumer Behavior, Health Benefit Plans, Employee, Health Maintenance Organizations, Humans, Insurance, Health, Preferred Provider Organizations, Insurance Selection Bias

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

A second model labelled each claim on 2026-10-06 (model jev-1.13-20260917, definition revision gold-guideline-v0.2).

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review