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Disability Insurance and the Dynamics of the Incentive Insurance Trade-Off
Open accessAbstract
We provide a life-cycle framework for comparing insurance and disincentive effects of disability benefits. The risks that individuals face and the parameters of the Disability Insurance (DI) program are estimated from consumption, health, disability insurance, and wage data. We characterize the effects of disability insurance and study how policy reforms impact behavior and welfare. DI features high rejection rates of disabled applicants and some acceptance of healthy applicants. Despite worse incentives, welfare increases as programs become less strict or generosity increases. Disability insurance interacts with welfare programs: making unconditional means-tested programs more generous improves disability insurance targeting and increases welfare. (JEL D14, J24, J65)
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Citations
Cited by
Maestas, N., Mullen, K. J., & Strand, A. (2013) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.103.5.1797 · Cited by 489
The Effect of Disability Insurance Receipt on Labor Supply
French, E., & Song, J. (2014) · American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · doi:10.1257/pol.6.2.291 · Cited by 309
Negative Home Equity and Household Labor Supply
BERNSTEIN, A. (2021) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/jofi.13070 · Cited by 83
Sleep, health, and human capital: Evidence from daylight saving time
Jin, L., & Ziebarth, N. R. (2020) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2019.12.003 · Cited by 68
Metadata
- Authors
- Low, H., & Pistaferri, L.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2015-10-01
- Volume
- 105
- Issue
- 10
- Pages
- 2986-3029
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1846764279
- Cited by
- 201
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 46.26
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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