The DOI matches its Crossref record; 22 of the 22 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Winner's Curse and Public Information in Common Value Auctions: Reply
Abstract
The Winner's Curse and Public Information in Common Value Auctions: Reply by Colin M. Campbell, John H. Kagel and Dan Levin. Published in volume 89, issue 1, pages 325-334 of American Economic Review, March 1999
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Moffitt, R. A. (2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.2.660 · Cited by 4,694
A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
Milgrom, P. R., & Weber, R. J. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911865 · Cited by 3,753
The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers
Roll, R. (1986) · The Journal of Business · doi:10.1086/296325 · Cited by 3,751
Let's Take the Con out of Econometrics
Leamer, E. E. (2026) · Journal of Business Cycle Research · doi:10.1007/s41549-026-00137-2 · Cited by 2,202
Microeconomic Systems as an Experimental Science
(1991) · Papers in Experimental Economics · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511528354.018 · Cited by 1,418
7. Auctions: A Survey of Experimental Research
Kagel, J. H. (1995) · The Handbook of Experimental Economics · doi:10.1515/9780691213255-009 · Cited by 785
Self-citationCompetitive Bidding in High-Risk Situations
Capen, E. C., Clapp, R. V., & Campbell, W. M. (1971) · Journal of Petroleum Technology · doi:10.2118/2993-pa · Cited by 647
Thaler, R. H. (1988) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.2.1.191 · Cited by 534
Industrial Organization Theory and Experimental Economics
Plott, C. R. (2001) · Edward Elgar Publishing eBooks · doi:10.4337/9781035304356.00008 · Cited by 474
Kagel, J. H., Harstad, R. M., & Levin, D. (2009) · Common Value Auctions and the Winner's Curse · doi:10.1515/9781400830138.177 · Cited by 458
Self-citationTheory and Misbehavior of First-Price Auctions
Harrison, G. W. (1987) · American Economic Review · Cited by 399
Theory and Behavior of Single Object Auctions
Cox, J. C., & Roberson, B. (1991) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511528354.031 · Cited by 395
Do Biases in Probability Judgment Matter in Markets? Experimental Evidence
Camerer, C. F. (1987) · American Economic Review · Cited by 371
Competitive bidding and proprietary information
Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R., Milgrom, P. R., & Weber, R. J. (1983) · Journal of Mathematical Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-4068(83)90034-4 · Cited by 311
Comparing Auctions for Risk Averse Buyers: A Buyer's Point of View
Matthews, S. A. (1987) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913603 · Cited by 240
A Comparison of Naive and Experienced Bidders in Common Value Offer Auctions: A Laboratory Analysis
Dyer, D., Kagel, J. H., & Levin, D. (1989) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2234207 · Cited by 235
Self-citationEfficiency in Auctions with Private and Common Values: An Experimental Study
Goeree, J. K., & Offerman, T. (2002) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/00028280260136435 · Cited by 154
The winner's curse: experiments with buyers and with sellers
Lind, B., & Plott, C. R. (1989) · CaltechAUTHORS (California Institute of Technology) · doi:10.7907/zz70j-d2260 · Cited by 113
Pooling cross-sections with unequal time-series lengths
Baltagi, B. H. (1985) · Economics Letters · doi:10.1016/0165-1765(85)90167-3 · Cited by 95
6 Revenue Effects and Information Processing in English Common Value Auctions
Levin, D., Kagel, J. H., & Richard, J. (2009) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9781400830138.210 · Cited by 80
Self-citationKagel, J. H., Levin, D., & Harstad, R. M. (1995) · International Journal of Game Theory · doi:10.1007/bf01243157 · Cited by 74
Self-citationFIRST‐PRICE COMMON VALUE AUCTIONS: BIDDER BEHAVIOR AND THE “WINNER'S CURSE”
Kagel, J. H., Levin, D., Battalio, R. C., & Meyer, D. J. (1989) · Economic Inquiry · doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.1989.tb00780.x · Cited by 68
Self-citation
Cited by
Timid choices and bold forecasts: a cognitive perspective on risk taking.
Kahneman, D., & Lovallo, D. (1993) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.39.1.17 · Cited by 2,043
The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework
Camerer, C. F., Hogarth, R. M., Budescu, D. V., & Eckel, C. (1999) · Elicitation of Preferences · doi:10.1007/978-94-017-1406-8_2 · Cited by 1,545
Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature
Klemperer, P. (1999) · Journal of Economic Surveys · doi:10.1111/1467-6419.00083 · Cited by 1,394
Roth, A. E. (2002) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00335 · Cited by 1,004
Option Valuation of Claims on Real Assets: The Case of Offshore Petroleum Leases
Paddock, J. L., Siegel, D. R., & Smith, J. L. (1988) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885541 · Cited by 811
Metadata
- Authors
- Campbell, C. M., Kagel, J. H., & Levin, D.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 1999-03-01
- Volume
- 89
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 325-334
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1985782116
- Cited by
- 514
- References
- 22
- FWCI
- 32.84
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.