The DOI matches its Crossref record; 21 of the 21 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Liberalization, Moral Hazard in Banking, and Prudential Regulation: Are Capital Requirements Enough?
Abstract
In a dynamic model of moral hazard, competition can undermine prudent bank behavior. While capital-requirement regulation can induce prudent behavior, the policy yields Pareto-inefficient outcomes. Capital requirements reduce gambling incentives by putting bank equity at risk. However, they also have a perverse effect of harming banks' franchise values, thus encouraging gambling. Pareto-efficient outcomes can be achieved by adding deposit-rate controls as a regulatory instrument, since they facilitate prudent investment by increasing franchise values. Even if deposit-rate ceilings are not binding on the equilibrium path, they may be useful in deterring gambling off the equilibrium path. (JEL G2, E4, L5)
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Self-citationBank concentration, competition, and crises: First results
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Metadata
- Authors
- Hellmann, T. F., Murdock, K. C., & Stiglitz, J. E.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2000-03-01
- Volume
- 90
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 147-165
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3124982262
- Cited by
- 2,088
- References
- 21
- FWCI
- 67.89
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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