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Fatal Attraction: Salience, Naïveté, and Sophistication in Experimental “Hide-and-Seek” Games

Crawford, Vincent P, Iriberri, Nagore·2007·American Economic Review

Abstract

“Hide-and-seek” games are zero-sum two-person games in which one player wins by matching the other's decision and the other wins by mismatching. Although such games are often played on cultural or geographic “landscapes” that frame decisions nonneutrally, equilibrium ignores such framing. This paper reconsiders the results of experiments by Rubinstein, Tversky, and others whose designs model nonneutral landscapes, in which subjects deviate systematically from equilibrium in response to them. Comparing alternative explanations theoretically and econometrically suggests that the deviations are well explained by a structural nonequilibrium model of initial responses based on “level-k” thinking, suitably adapted to nonneutral landscapes. (JEL C72, C92)

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Metadata

Authors
Crawford, V. P., & Iriberri, N.
Venue
American Economic Review
Published
2007-12-01
Volume
97
Issue
5
Pages
1731-1750
ISSN
0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2987072834
Cited by
230
References
0
FWCI
36.99
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Fatal Attraction: Salience, Naïveté, and Sophistication in Experimental “Hide-and-Seek” Games. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1257/aer.97.5.1731
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Crawford, V. P., & Iriberri, N. (2007). Fatal Attraction: Salience, Naïveté, and Sophistication in Experimental “Hide-and-Seek” Games. American Economic Review. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.97.5.1731

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