The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Behavioral Equilibrium in Economies with Adverse Selection
Abstract
I propose a new solution concept—behavioral equilibrium—to study environments with players who are naive, in the sense that they fail to account for the informational content of other players' actions. I apply the framework to certain adverse selection settings and show that, contrary to the existing literature, the adverse selection problem is exacerbated when naive players fail to account for selection. More generally, the main distinguishing feature of the framework is that, in equilibrium, beliefs about both fundamentals and strategies are jointly restricted. Consequently, whether a behavioral bias may arise or not is determined endogenously in equilibrium. (JEL C70, D82, D83)
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Cites
COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS
Vickrey, W. (1961) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.x · Cited by 7,722
Aragones, E., Gilboa, I., Postlewaite, A., & Schmeidler, D. (2005) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282805775014308 · Cited by 123
Cited by
SELECTIVE ATTENTION AND LEARNING
Schwartzstein, J. (2014) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1111/jeea.12104 · Cited by 269
Aragones, E., Gilboa, I., Postlewaite, A., & Schmeidler, D. (2005) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282805775014308 · Cited by 123
Selection Neglect and Political Beliefs
Brundage, M., Little, A. T., & You, S. (2022) · doi:10.31219/osf.io/p49at · Cited by 7
Metadata
- Authors
- Esponda, I.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2008-08-01
- Volume
- 98
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1269-1291
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2166537133
- Cited by
- 163
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 12.81
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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