The DOI matches its Crossref record; 24 of the 24 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Strategic Leniency and Cartel Enforcement
Abstract
The cornerstone of cartel enforcement in the United States and elsewhere is a commitment to the lenient prosecution of early confessors. A burgeoning game-theoretical literature is ambiguous regarding the impacts of leniency. I develop a theoretical model of cartel behavior that provides empirical predictions and moment conditions, and apply the model to the complete set of indictments and information reports issued over a 20-year span. Statistical tests are consistent with the notion that leniency enhances deterrence and detection capabilities. The results have implications for market efficiency and enforcement efforts against cartels and other forms of organized crime. (JEL D43, L12, L13, K21)
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Cited by
Robustness checks and robustness tests in applied economics
Lu, X., & White, H. (2014) · Journal of Econometrics · doi:10.1016/j.jeconom.2013.08.016 · Cited by 412
Trust, Leniency, and Deterrence
Bigoni, M., Fridolfsson, S.-O., Le Coq, C., & Spagnolo, G. (2015) · Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/ewv006
Metadata
- Authors
- Miller, N. H.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2009-05-01
- Volume
- 99
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 750-768
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1983884254
- Cited by
- 289
- References
- 24
- FWCI
- 51.78
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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