The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
AI and Our Economic Future
Abstract
Artificial intelligence (AI) will likely be the most transformative technology of the modern era. What if machines—AI for cognitive tasks and AI plus advanced robots for physical tasks—can perform every task a human can? This essay makes three main points. First, even though US growth rates have been stable at roughly 2 percent per year for 150 years, it is distinctly possible that automating intelligence leads economic growth rates to accelerate. Second, this acceleration is likely to be slowed by the presence of “weak links.” While we each have access to 100 million times more transistors on our desktop computer than people in the 1970s, we are not 100 million times more productive. Computers can invert matrices at lightning speed, but we humans must still decide what matrix to invert, what hypothesis to test, and so on. Accelerating economic growth requires the vast majority of the weak links to be automated away, which delays the large gains. Finally, even though weak links slow the benefits, they may actually speed up the risks. When a chain is only as strong as its weakest link, damaging one link in the chain can be very costly. A powerful AI that is superhuman at software engineering could be misused by a bad actor to do substantial harm by hacking the financial system or a virology lab.
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“The leading argument is the bottleneck or weak-links hypothesis: AI raises productivity in some tasks, but output is limited by complementary tasks that humans still perform at unchanged productivity (Kremer, 1993;Jones, 2011Jones, , 2026)).”
From Writing Code vs. Shipping Code: Productivity Effects Across Generations of AI Coding Tools (2026) · cites this paper as Jones, 2026
In the citing paper
“Jones (2026) shows that fully automating a subset of tasks raises output by at most a factor determined by the spending share of the tasks that are not automated; our bound (10) coincides with this result, with the share parameter 𝜃 in the role of Jones's spending share”
From Writing Code vs. Shipping Code: Productivity Effects Across Generations of AI Coding Tools (2026) · cites this paper as Jones (2026)
In the citing paper
“The bound in Equation ( 15) coincides with the automation bound in Jones (2026), with the share parameter 𝜃 in the role of Jones's spending share.”
From Writing Code vs. Shipping Code: Productivity Effects Across Generations of AI Coding Tools (2026) · cites this paper as Jones (2026)
In the citing paper
“With strong complements (𝜎 = 0.25), even infinite upstream input raises output by at most 26%.At 𝜎 = 0.5, the illustrative case in Jones (2026), the maximum gain is a doubling.The bound increases sharply as 𝜎 approaches the Cobb-Douglas knife-edge (𝜎 = 1), where it disappears entirely.”
From Writing Code vs. Shipping Code: Productivity Effects Across Generations of AI Coding Tools (2026) · cites this paper as Jones (2026)
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Citations
Cites
The simple macroeconomics of AI
Acemoglu, D. (2025) · Economic Policy · doi:10.1093/epolic/eiae042 · Cited by 317
Research works printed but not linked: 27
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Cited by
Writing Code vs. Shipping Code: Productivity Effects Across Generations of AI Coding Tools
Demirer, M., Musolff, L., & Yang, L. (2026) · doi:10.3386/w35275 · Cited by 22
Metadata
- Authors
- Jones, C. I.
- Affiliations
- Charles I. Jones is the Stanco25 Professor of Economics, Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford, California; also a Research Associate, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Perspectives
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2026-08-01
- Volume
- 40
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 3-22
- ISSN
- 0895-3309
- 1944-7965
- Cited by
- 4
- References
- 1
- Language
- en
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